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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
"Economic" man, in his quest for solutions to the various problems 
which complicate his environment, often finds it somewhat difficult to 
meet his "self-actualizing" level of goal attainment (i. e. , maxi=iize sub-
ject to constraints, behave rationally, achieve optimality). Thus, man's 
search for answers to his problems is not one of "proceeding directly 
from point A to point B", but, rather, is one in whic� he proceeds in a 
heuristic fashion --- attempting to discover the answer to subproblems 
within the problem space. This, he hopes, will ultimately lead to a 
solution to the original global problem. 
This concept is foreign to the deterministic tendencies of "econ-
omic" man, but will afford a much more flexible framework for viewing 
economic theory. Additionally, it will allow for relaxation of several 
''classic" economic assumptions on man's problem solving be�avior. 
The exploration of the verbal behavior (protocol) of man as he 
solves a simple allocation task will reveal policy prescriptions concern-
ing the role of input data and "external noise" as it relates to the con-
cept formulation of.the problem solver. Empirically, the problem solver 
vill have his protocol recorded as he solves a task in which key external 
. noise variables are excluded (Problem Space #2). This protocol, and its 
associated methodology, will, then, be compared (in a utility framework) 
to a solution to the same task which was previously solved by the subject 
(Problem Space #1). The main difference is that the "noise" which was 
• 
physically eliminated from Problem Space #2 was included in Problem Space 
#1 . All essential data for solution to each of the problem spaces is 
identical, it becomes obvious that any differences in utility from prob­
lem space to problem space are the result of differences in the external 
noise which will have been manipulated. This noise will be shown to be 
directly influencing the internal representation of the problem space, 
thus, affecting the problem solving methodology of the problem solver. 
The magnitude ( negative or positive ) of this influence on the utility of 
�he final solution will lead to policy prescriptions on the composition 
of data set which will yield higher quality decisions in a given task 
environment. 
2 
A broad overview of the. techniques to be employed will be presented 
in Chapter 1. The use of protocols in analyzing verbal behavior will be 
attended in Chapter 2. with a discussion of the task environment to 
follow in Chapter 3. The measurement process in evaluating the problem 
solver's performance is covered in Chapter 4. This will terminate the 
discussion of preliminary background material. 
·rn Chapter 5 , a test subject's protocol will be analyzed, finish­
ing with conclusions in Chapter 6 .  For those unfamiliar with heuristics, 
Appendix 1 contains some background on the heuristic process. Appendix 
II contains the production processes used in protocols. 
Problem Goals 
The objective of this paper is to examine in depth one aspect of 
human problem solving; specifically, to deal with a task environment 
familiar to the managerial practiocioner --- one of allocating scarce 
resources in an equitable and efficient manner toward the acc9mplis�ent 
of a defined goal. The central focus will be on measuring the problem 
solver's relative efficiency and equitability in solving this allocation 
task using two different sets of data. To observe the problem solver's 
thought processes, the "thinking aloud protocol" will be used. The use 
or protocols i.s discussed in Chapter 2. 
Of prime importance in the evaluation of protocols is ( 1 ) the 
goal of the problem solution and (2) the data given to the problem 
solver for use in arriving at this goal. The goal toward which the prob-
lem solver is striving has two distinct areas. 
One area is that of systemic goals. Systemic goals refer to 
those policy-related goals which act as constraints on the problem sol-
ver's ability to manipulate his resources. The second area of goal at-
tainment facing the problem solver involves the goals expressed to the 
problem solver by the human resources which the problem solver will be 
3 
using as "inputs" to satisfy the policy-dictated goals. An "input" is de-
fined, in the present context, as a resource which may be applied in 
given quantiti.es toward the solution of a problem. 
Therefore, the deduction follows that the actual, defined, goal 
or the problem solver will be to generate a solution set which �'satis­
fices"1 the human ·resources needs ( or goals ) subject to the constraints 
l"An earmark of all those situations where we 'satisfice' for an 
inability to optimize is that, although the set of available alternatives 
is "given" in a certain abstract sense (we can define a generator guaran­
teed to generate all of them eventually) , it is not given in the only 
sense that is practically relevant. We cannot, within practical computa­
tional liinits generate all the admissible alternatives and compare their 
respective merits. Nor can we recognize the best alternative, even if we 
are fortunate to generate it early, until we have seen all of them. We 
satis�ice by looking for alternatives in such a way that we can generally 
find an acceptable one after only moderate search. " 
4 
placed upon him by the systemic goals. Assume that his final solution set 
has associated with it a utility matrix ( U )  where U is constructed as 
follows: 
u = 
'-il '-i2 �3 • • • 'Lin 
'll21 'll22 �3 • • • �n 
u31 u32 u.33 • • • 'll.3n 
• • 
• • 
• 
kl k2 k3 • • •  Ukn 
where 
n = number of activities scheduled 
k = number of human inputs 
kn = the utility associated with a 
specific activity being scheduled 
on the nth day for the kth indivi­
dual as perceived by the problem 
solver. 
U is an internal representation ( i. e. , in ordinal utility framework ) of 
vhat the problem solver views to be the utility space of each of his 'k' 
human resources. This matrix may contain noise which the problem solver 
was unable to filter out due to his perception process. One can assuine 
that the problem solver will be adequately motivated to apply himself 
toward the solution, thus eliminating any distortions in the utility mat-
rix due to a poorly motivated subject. 
Data Sets 
To reach a solution, the problem solver will. be presented an in-
troductory data set to aid in his problem solving process. The data will 
consist of two basic types: 
1. Internal Data-all relevant information which serves as a ref-
erence in reaching a final solution. 
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2. External Data-data which may be viewed in a cybernetic context, 
consisting of."white noise", or extraneous, irrelevant information. 
One logical objection against the classification of data as "nee-
essary" or "unnecessary" is: whose definition of' "necessary" does one 
use? In most task environments, one could find numerous difficulties in 
separating input stimuli into these two groups (external, or unnecessary, 
versus internal, or necessary). However, in the task environment pre- . 
sented in this paper, the introductory data set is manipulated so that 
only."key external· data"2 and internal data need be inspected for their 
effect on the problem solution. (All other external data may be con-
sidered constant in both problem spaces and need not be analyzed. ) Thus, 
the key external data is considered "unnecessary" simply because a solu-
tion may be reached even if no key external data were given to the prob-
lem solver. The internal data set is considered "necessary" because it 
contains constraints (policy goals) and revealed preferences without 
which the problem solver would be unable to reach a consistant conclusion. 
Two Problem Spaces 
The task consists of solving two allocation problems using dif-
ferent introductory data sets in solving each of the two problems. These 
two introductory data sets will contain common internal data and dissimilar 
external data. 
2By"key" data I am referring to data which will distort an individ­
ual's filtering mechanisms, thus allowing "external" data to be included 
in one's internal representati_on of a problem. See Chapter 2,. 
The phenomena to be observed will be the role of the external 
data set in the solution of the problem. Pragmatically, one would as-
sume that regardless of the content of the external data set, the 
solutions arr�ved at by the problem solver would be of equal quality 
given common internal data. However, the two external data sets will be 
constructed to ellicit perceptual distortions in the problem solving 
technique of the problem solver. One external data set will approximate 
a null (empty) set in terms of the subject's perceptual mechanisms. The 
second external data set is one in which the problem solver has strong 
preconceived perceptual attitudes. (REMEMBER: For each problem solver 
who solves the two problems, one is assuming external noise to be con-
stant --- except for the intentionally manipulated key external data 
variables). 
By analyzing the final solution sets generated by the problem 
solver using the two dissimilar introductory data sets, one may pre-
6 
scribe policy implications for the construction of th.e introductory data 
sets from which a problem solver is most likely to produce high quality 
decisions. 3 The relative merits of each of the final solution sets will 
3The intent of looking at various structures of data set construc­
tion is based on an intellectual hunch that certain decisions have associ­
ated with them negative components of utility, i. e. , or absence of posi­
tive utility components, which decrease the total utility of the decision. 
These negative contributions to total utility result from the perceptual 
distortions of the problem solver as he is faced with data which is ir­
relevant to the problem solution.  These distortions cause filtering 
mechanisms to permit data into "memory" for use on problem solving, when 
this data should rationally be rejected. Thus, we can have decisions 
Which are of higher quality than others, even though we are assuming a 
satisficing problem solver. In fact, this faulty filtering mechanism 
may, indeed, contribute to man's "limited rationality". 
be measured in a utility theory framework.4 By formulating a utility 
function which accurately depicts the various contributions to utility 
from each individual human resource, it will be possible to measure the 
performance of the problem solver under the different environmental con-
ditions brought about by the variation in the two introductory d·ata sets. 
Central to this is the fact that the variation from one intro.ductory 
data set to another is functionally related to the external data set 
only. Therefore, any differences in the utility of the two final solu-
tion sets can be attributed only to differences in the composition of 
the "key external data variables". 
It is assumed that the problem solver is familiar with the task 
environment and, given that all constraints and parameters are consistent 
throughout the problem space, that several satisficing solutions are 
possible (i.e., at least one solution for each combination of internal 
and external data) .. 
The problem solver will always reach the same solution if (1) his 
1 
internal representation of the data set is unchanged and (2) that the time 
required to reach a solution is short enough so that one can say that he 
is "psychologically constant" (his problem solving methodology is con-
stant; no learning has taken place) . Different solutions are only 
4rt should be emphasized that although this paper employs utility 
theory as an evaluative tool in terms of deducing which alternative best 
meets the defined goal, the actual search technique will not be an opti­
mizing technique (as is classic to utility theory) , but, rather, will in­
volve use of heuristics for choosing "satisfactory" alternatives, (See 
Chapters 2 and 3 ) • 
8 
possible if different information is included in the problem space which · 
the problem solver internalizes. 
Empirical Process 
An intuitive grasp of the use of protocols in investigating human 
problem solving is necessary prior to developing the methodological 
framework proposed by this paper. The subject of protocols will neces­
sarily by a cursory examination, aue to the scope of this paper; however, 
the reader will be introduced to the underlying concepts. Next, the in­
terface between the general task environment and the problem solver's 
internal mechanisms will be discussed in Chapter 3. In order to relate 
protocol efficiency to the problem space of the specific task environment, 
methodology must be developed for relative ranking of the solutions 
achieved by the application of the different combinations of external and 
internal data. Therefore, in Chapter 4 , utility theory will be examined 
as a tool for measurement • 
. The choice of utility theory as a background to this study is a 
practical one for two purposes: 
1. One may adequately sum all of the human resources' utility 
functions in the formulation of a total utility function, thus affording 
the advantage of flexibility in allowing for the various behavioral goals 
of each individual by use of ordinal ranking procedures. 
2. Although the problem solver may be unable to attach quantita­
tive value to his decisions, through utility theory he may qualitita­
tively evaluate each of his decisions in terms of that decision's 
> 
/ ,  
contribution to total utility. This will give a sound basis for evalua­
ting the problem solver's performance, relative to his given task. 
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Chapter 2 
HUMAN PROTOCOLS 
The use of protocols as a psychological tool for the study of 
cognitive processes, specifically, problem solving processes, has "be­
come a sort of hallmark of the information processing approach". In 
employing protocols to analyze problem solving behavior one is generally 
stating that "thinking" can be explained by an information processing 
theory. By analyzing the verbal behavior ( protocol ) of a problem solver, 
as a source of data, researchers have discovered much about the informa­
tion which the problem solver has available and how he plans to process 
this information. The theory that man is an_information processing sys­
tem was purported as early as the 1940's when the study of human organi­
zational behavior was advanced by the growing influence of the entire 
spectrum of applied mathematics and technology. Previously, psychology 
had been concerned with "learning, lower organisms, and tasks that are 
simple· from an adult human viewpoint". 1 With an influx of technological 
advancement, most notably the computer, changes began to emerge in the 
emphasis of psychology. One can date the change roughly "from 1956: in 
psychology, by the appearance of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austins' 'Study of 
Thinking' and George Miller's 'The Magical No. 7'; in linguistics, by Norm 
Chomship's 'Three Models of Language'; and ·in computer science, by our own 
paper (Herbert Simon and Allen Newell) on the 'Logic Theory Machine'. "2 
ltlewell and Simon, Human Problem Solving, p. 4. 
2rbid. 
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Although the emphasis at this time was not involved directly with problem 
solving, they all did express the need to "be explicit about internal, 
symbolic mechanisms"3 and were dealing with the theory surrounding com­
plex processes·. Now, with the development of computer science, the psy­
chologist, the linguist, and the computer scientist were able to combine 
their respective disciplines to offer methods of comprehensive studies of 
hmnan problem solving. In fact, the basic flavor of the entire area is 
that "a computer can indeed be a metaphor for man; then it becomes rele­
vant to discover whether man is all bits on the inside. " 4 
The Theory 
The theory itself has the following form: 5 
1. A Process Theory-This theory posits a set of processes or mechan�sms 
that produce human thinking. It purports to explain behavior-and not just 
to describe it, however parsimoniously. 
2 .  Theory of the Individual-The technical apparatus for conceptualizing 
Information Processing System ( IPS ) leads first of all to constructing 
particular programs that accomplish particular tasks. When applied to 
psychology, this procedure leads naturally to constructing IPSs that model 
the behavior of a single individual in a single task situation • • •  Freud ''s 
dictum that all behavior is caused seems the natural one, and only rarely 
3rbid. 
4Newell and Simon, Human Problem Solving, p. 5. 
_5Newell and Simon, Human Problem Solving, pp. 9-15. 
do we assign some aspects of behavior to probabilistic generation. 
3. A Content-Oriented Theory-dramatized in the peculiarity that the 
theory performs the task it explains. The orientation toward content is 
two-fold (a) it removes barriers toward extension of the theory_�d (b) 
IPS theories have opportunities for describing human behavior that are 
foreclosed to theories unable to cope with content. 
4. A D.ynamically Oriented Theory-It describes the change in a system 
through time. Such a theory describes the time course of behavior, 
characterizing each new act as a function of the immediately preceding 
state of the organism and of its enviromnent. Several strategies are 
used in describing the dynamic.motion of the behavior of the system over 
time. (a) The most basic is taking a completely specific initial state 
and tracing out the time course of the system by applying iteratively 
the given laws that sa:y what happens in the next instant of time. ( b) To 
solve the differential laws to yield an expression describing the state 
of the system at each point in time as a function of the initial state. 
( c ) To prove that some property of the system is invariant over time­
that it holds, despite variation in other aspects of the system. 
5. A Non-Statiscal Theory- There is not a well-behaved Euclidean space 
of numerical measurements in which to plot and compare human behavior 
with theory. Theory and data are compared when possible, and some at­
tempts are made to measure and tabulate such comparisons. 
12 
6 .  Sufficiency Analysis-The theory puts a premium on discovering and 
describing systems of mechanisms that are sufficient to perform the 
cognitive task under study. The emphasis on sufficiency is still rather 
foreign to psychology. Almost never has it been asked of ·a psychological 
theory whether it could explain why man was capable of performing the 
behavior in question. Thus, it is a current lively question in psycho-
linguistics whether the mechanisms of classical stimulus-response learn-
13 
ing theory ar� sufficient to account for the child's learning of language 
(it being concluded, not surprisingly, that they are not). 6 
Information Processing Systems 
With this basic knowledge.of information theory, one can proceed 
to a definitive explanation of an IPS. The general structure of an 
IPS is diagrammed in Figure 1. 
The following tenants concerning an IPS can be made in spite of 
the fact that the complications of motor and sensory processes are inten­
tionally excluded from analysis. 7 
1. There is a set of elements called symbols. 
2. A symbol structure consists of a set of tokens (equivalently, in-
stances of occurrences) of symbols connected by a set of relations. 
3. A memory is a component of an IPS capable of storing and retaining 
symbol structures. 
4. An information processing system is a process that has symbol struc-
tures for (some of) ·its inputs or outputs. 
5. A processor is a component of an IPS consisting of: 
a. A fixed set of elementary information processes (eip) 
6Newell and Simon, Human Problem Solving, p. 13. 
1Newell and Simon, Human Problem Solving, p. 5. 
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b. A short term memory (STM) that holds input and output symbol 
symbol structures of the eips'. 
c. An interpreter that determines the sequence of eip's to be 
14 
executed by the IPS as a function of the symbol structures in STM. 
6. A symbol structure designates (equivalently, references or points to) 
an object if there exists information processes that admit the structure 
as input and either: 
a. Affect the object; or 
b. Produce, as output, symbol structures that depend on the object. 
7 .  A symbol structure is a program if (a) .the object it designates is 
an information process and (b) the interpreter, if given the progr�, can 
execute the designated process. (Literally, this should read, "if given 
an input that designates the program") . 
8 . A symbol is primitive if its designation (or its creation) is fixed 
by the elementary information process or by the external environment of 
the IPS. 
A Sample Protocol 
The use of protocols in this paper will be to determine strategic 
points in the problem solving process where variations occur with respect 
to the external data which has been internalized by the problem solver. 
The technique of locating strategic individual protocols may be shown by 
examination of the following sample. 
In Table 1 is a portion of the protocols of Subject S3 solving the 
cryptarithriletic task "DONALD + GERALD = ROBERT" with D = 5 as the given 
initial state. 
.'!-
..... 
/, 
initial state.
8
. Under the colunm heading, Inferred Productions, are. 
listed the processes, or production systems, which S3 is employing to 
solve the task. A complete description of the production processes may 
be found in Appendix II. 
The notes following the extracted portion of the protocol of S3 
provide detailed information in regard to specific protocols. This same 
procedure will be used.to analyz� the protocol of the problem solver in 
the resource allocation problem presented in this paper. 
The verbal behavior exhibited in a protocol ( see Figure 1 )  is a 
direct result of the problerr. s.olver's receptors which filter information 
into the processor mechanism. The exact nature of the task environment 
and the relation of the problem solver to the task environment will now 
be discussed. 
�ewell and Simon, Hur.ian Problem Solving, p. 20. 
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ENVIRONMENT 
IPS 
RECEPTORS 
PROCESSOR 
EFFECTORS 
Figure i-
Information Processing System_ 
MEMORY 
........ 
O'\ 
Phase 
Number 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B8 
B9 
BlO 
Bll 
Bl2 
Bl3 
Bl4 
Table 1 
1 Sample Protocol 
Protocol 
Each letter has one and only 
one numerical value • • •  
(E: One numeri cal value.) 
There are Ten di fferent letters 
and e ach of them has one numeri­
cal value. 
Therefore , I can, looking at the 
two D's • • •  
each D is 5; 
therefore , T i s  zero. 
So I think I 'll start by writing 
that problem here. 
I 'll write T ,  T is zero 
Now , do I have any other T's? 
No. 
But I have another D. 
That means I have a 5 over the 
other side. 
Now I have 2 A's 
Bl5* and 2L' s. Bl6 that are each • • •  
Bl7 somewhere • • •  
Bl8 and this R • • •  
Bl9 3 R's 
B20 
B21 
B22 
2 L's equal an R • • •  
Of course I'm carrying a 1 
Which will mean that R has to 
be an.odd number . 
Inferred Productions 
?: (ask E about rules) 
17 
Pl: D �5_, FC(DH=)coi); 
PC[col.l] ( =) T=O new) 
Pll: T=O�TD (T ,O) � +) 
Pl: T=O � FC(T ) �fail)  
Pl: D �5-+ FC(D) �col.6) 
(ilo PC) 
P9: get all-letters�FL 
(all-letters)(� R); 
get R 
P2: . get R _.. FC(R) \-=) col.2) : 
PC[col . 2 :for R](:+R . 
odd new )  
-� 
..... 
/, 
Phase 
Number 
B22.l 
B23 
B24 
B25 
B26 
B27 
B28* 
B29 
B30 
B30.1* 
B31 
B32 
B33 
B3� 
B36 
B37 
B38 
Table l ( continue.d) 
Protocol 
Because the 2L's • • •  
� 
any two numbers added together 
has to be an even number 
and l will be an odd number 
So R can be 1 
3 
not 5, 
7 
or 9. 
(E: What are you thinking now? 
Now G • • •  
Since R i s  going to be an odd 
number and D is  5 ,  
G has to be an even number. 
I 'm looking at the left side of 
this problem here where it says 
D+G. 
Oh , plus possibly another number 
if I have to carry 1 from the 
E+O. 
18 
Inferred Productions 
Pl3: PC unclear � get R; 
repeat R 
t: PC[col.2 for R] 
(�R odd ) 
P 4: get R -- BN(F.) 
(� 1 v 3 " 5 v 7 v 9 
Pll: R=deol> TD(R,d) (� (R=. 
5 C)(D �5 note) 
'l : 
P2: get R __,. FC(R)(� col. 
6): PC[col•6 for R] 
(� G even new) 
i: PC[col.6 for G] 
(� c 6  unknown) 
/ ,  
Phase 
Number 
B39* 
B4o
* 
B41 
B42 
B43 
B44
* 
B45 
B46 
B47 
B48
* 
B49 
B50 
Table 1 (continued) 
Protoc ol 
I think I'll forget about that 
for a minute 
Possibly the best way to get to 
this problem is to try different 
possible solutions. 
I'm not sure whether that would 
be the easiest way or not. 
Well, if we assume • • •  
if we assum.e that L is, say, 1, 
we'll have l+l that's 3 or R. 
We'll put a 3 here, 
and one here. 
Well, 5 plus something has to 
equal 3 in that case • •.• 
I suppose it's • • • 
Well, not • • • 
it's not p ossible that there 
could be another letter in 
front of this R is it? 
19 
Inferred Productions 
?: 
P3: get R � FA( R)( �col.2); 
AV( L) (;:;>L +-1); 
f: PC[col.2 �or R] 
C-* R=3 new) 
Pll: R=3 n�w -">TD(R,3) 
(� +) 
Pl: R-3 new .... FC(R)(� 
col . 6 )  PC[col.6] . 
(� c7=1 unknown) . 
/ 
. P6: c7=1 unknown � get 
c7=1 
P2: get c7=1 � FC(c&) 
(=� col.7); PC[col.7 
for c7](=� a (zl note) 
zl: letter at bottom 
of co l.. 7 does not 
exist 
PlO: zl note -� check zl 
?: che ck zl -• ask (E) 
<=� fai1) 
Phase 
Number 
B50.l 
B51 
B52 
B53 
B54 
B55* 
B56 
B57 
B58 
B59 
B60 
Protocol 
Is it not? 
(E:no.) 
It's not • • •  
all right • • • 
so if • • •  
Table 1 (continued) 
if that couldn't be a 13 
on the left side, 
then R cannot be 3. 
R has to be a nuriber 
greater than 5 
which me ans that it can 
e ither be 7 
or 0 
So we'll start back here 
and make it a 7 
Now if the • • •  
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Inferred Productions 
Pl3: ask(E) unclear -� get 
zl; repeat 
f : ask(E) ( ==> zl 
(from E)) 
Pl2: c7=1 D -� FA(c7=1) 
( =� R• 3 )  ; ( R= 3 rJ , ) 
P2: get -�FC(R)(=:} col.6); 
PC[col.6 for R](=�R> 
5 new) 
P4: get -� GN(R)(=� 7 V 9) 
Pll: R=d -�TD(R,d)(=�) 
iP4: AV(R)(=� 
R �-7 new) 
Pl: · R -'-7 new-� FC(R)(==­
col.2); PC[col.2] (= 
L-3 new) 
Phase 
Number 
B63 * 
B64 
B64.l 
B65 
B66 
B67 
B68 
B69 
B70 
B7l 
Table 1 (continued) 
Protocol 
Ob, I'm sorry, I said some­
thing incorrect here. 
I 'm making • • •  
No, no, I didn't either. 
R is going to be 7 
then this will be 7 
and that will be 7 
and it's the L's that will be 
3's 
because 3+3 is 6 
+l is 7 
Now, it doesn't matter anywhere 
what the L's are equal to • • •  
Inferred Productions 
Pll: L=3 new-�TD(R,3 ) 
(� (L=3 ct ) (R=3 
note) ) 
Pl3: PC unclear-� get L: 
repeat PC 
t: PC[col.2 for L] 
( =� L=3 new ) 
Pll: L=3 new-� TD(L,3) 
( =� + ) 
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Pl: L=3 new FC(L ) ( fail) 
1Protocol for Subject S3 on Donald +.Gerald = Robert (Simon, Human 
Problem Solving, op. cit., Appendix 6.1 ) �  
*Asterisks refer to the notes that follow the protocol. 
Bl 
B5 
BB 
Bl6 
B28 
B30.l 
B35 
B39 
B40 
B44 
B48 
B55 
B61 
B62 
B63 
B72 
• 
.  
Table l {continued) 
Notes to Protocol 
The exchange deals �ith the definition of the problem, hence is 
outside the problem space. 
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The subject has been told that D --5 prior to the start pf the tape. 
We do not encode writing operations. 
After identifying A's and L's, seaxching 'for more occurrences. 
The pattern shows for R in Bl8-Bl9. 
"not 5" shows 83 is generating and testing at same time. 
Don't know what 83 does after GN. 
Shows 83 has ignored carry. 
Don't know what the decision is based upon; however, there is no 
place to go as lone as assignments are not made (see B40). 
One of the few indications of development (or change} of methods. 
S3 is writing 3's at col.2, col.4, and col.6. 
"I suppose it's (not possible)." Determined by repeat in B50. 
Precursor to B56. 
"back here" indicates col.2. 
"Now if the (R is 7, L must be 3 ) ." 
The difficulty is R = 3 coupled with a general confusion between 
L and R. The continuation through B71. adds support: "It's the 
L's that will have to be 3's." Bl05 and Bl86, where 83 assigns 
L --9 and net R --9, confirms this. 
· 
Evidence for FC being evoked after new information derived (L=3). 
(The interested reader will find a complete account of this proto­
col and the symbol representation in Simon, Human Problem Solving, op. 
cit.1 pp. 163-259.) 
Chapter 3 
TASK ENVIRONMENT 
A central tenet to all economic theory is that "economic man is 
always motivat�d to maximize his utility, and that he is always able to 
di d t th . . . b h . nl scover an execu e e maximizing e avior • • •  Thus, in economics, one 
is largely unburdened by the psychological aspects of decision-making. If 
the behavior displayed by the problem solver is indeed "rational" and the 
behavior is appropriate toward the accomplishment of a goal given a spe-
cific task environment, then it follows that the behavior exh�bited by the 
problem solver provides insight into the task environment-not the problem 
solver himself. In economics ( assuming a properly motiva.ted subject) one 
can, then, avoid a confrontation with the psychological aspects of decision 
making and need only be concerned with the environment-market places, lin-
ear programming mouels, cost and revenue functions, etc. If the psycholo-
gist were to follow the example of the economist: "to construct a theory 
of co�cept formation that depended on no characteristics of the subject, 
other than his being adequately motivated to perform well1 it would be a 
theory of how the perfectly rational man would behave in that task en-
vironment."2 In psychology, however , one is always :faced with the idea?-, 
1ifowell and Simon, Human Problem Solvin_g_, p. 54. 
2Newell and Simon , Human Problem Solvin4, p. 54. 
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how man should behave, and the experimental, how man does behave.3 Con-
sistently, the discrepancies between ideal and actual results are large. 
The question of why this discrepancy in behavior exists necessitates the 
reexamination of the predictive model. Rather-than studying the theory 
of environments, one must deal with the theory of the psychology-of 
human rationality. To date, most O.ata suggests that man's "limited ration-
ality" ( i.e., the difference between real and actual behavior; Simon, 1947) 
is a result of the limit on the number of symbols which the problem 
solver can retain for future manipulations in his shor-term memory. This 
is a prime assumption in explaining the problem solver's inability to 
reach optimal decisions. 
Problem Solving Mechanisms 
As stated earlier, the problem solver will be solving two similar 
problems, each of which possesses different external environmental data 
sets. The representation of a problem space as it relates to the problem 
solver is depicted in Figure 2. ( This is adapted from Figure 4.1, Simon 
and Newell, Human Problem Solving, op. cit. ) . 
� The use of "ideal" of any situation is defined as a state of con­
ditions that is given to the problem solver as normative guidelines which 
can be considered static in the immediate decision space. An example of 
an ideal condition is: to maximize total utility subject to certain con­
straints. It is logical to assume that the _society holds these "ideals" 
in static equilibrium over a relatively long time frame when compared to 
the time requirements .of the problem solving process, thereby allowing 
dismissal of all effects ( on the decision's outcome ) of group dynamics 
( i.e., external societal pressure ) . One can positively state that the 
difference-between "ideal". and experimental behavior.is not a result of 
the problem solver's inability to determine what is "ideal" from the 
societal standpoint, but is rather a result of his physical limitations 
in symbol storage and manipulation. 
TASK ENVIRONMENT 
,.--�------------IC"" n PROBLEM STATEMENT 
· ( INTERNAL DATA ) 
EXTERNAL DATA 
.,, /'SET #1 
,,,,. 
. .,,,,., 
.,__ _ # 
""" ....... """""' -.... ,EXTERNAL DATA 
.-����-t-���������--1-���������������--2S$T #2 
AFFECT 
ENVIRONMENT 
INTERNAL 
GENERAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
APPLY 
METHOD 
TRANSLATE 
INPUTS 
TRANSLATE 
INPUTS 
PROBLEM 
SOLVER 
INTERNALREPRESENTATION 
CHANGE 
REPRESENTATION SELECT 
METHOD 
�TROD 
STOHE 
NOTE: THE «_ INDICATES THA'r INPUT . 
Figure � 
REP'PESENTATION IS NOT UNDER CONTROL 
OF INPUTTING PROCESS. 
Human Problem Solving Process 
I\) 
V1 
4 
The internal representation of the task environment is related 
.to the problem solver's interpretation of the internal data set and of 
the external data set. Once an internal representation is formulated, 
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the problem solver responds by selecting a "method" to solve the problem. 
It follows that if the external data changes in each of the two problems 
to be solved, then the internal representation of the problem will change 
( unless all external data· in both .. data sets is effectively filtered out 
by the problem solver). Given this, the selection of problem solving 
methods will also change. By manipulating the external data, one will be 
manipulating the problem solver's internal representation of the problem, 
which, it is postulated, will affect the final solution o f  the problem by 
changing the method selection process. Thus, problem solving behavior 
can be said to be a function of task environment and an individual's in-
ternal representation of the task environment. Both o f  these areas will 
affect the choice of methodology. 
How this selection procedure is manifested can be explained by the 
heuristics-search-method. Basically, the problem solver undergoes a 
series of generate-and-test cycles at lower and lower levels of goal sub-
goal attainment, until he reaches a level where he is capable of solvin� 
a particular subgoal. This method is depicted in the flow diagram of Fig-
ure 3. In this diagram, one will notice four new terms: select element, 
select operator, evaluate ( new-element ), and decide-next-step. In Table 2 ,  
4Newell and Simon, Human Problem Solving, pp. 59-66 . 
.> 
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are listed some of the ways in which these terms ( processes ) have been 
specified in heuristic programs. This table lists only key notions, and 
is not intended to give complete specification. 
In order to test the problem solver ' s  internalization of data, the 
"evaluate process" will be of greatest concern , as it is here that the 
problem solver will be deciding on the usefulness of the various bits of 
internal and external datum. 
Table 2 
Heuristics . for Heuristic-Search Method* 
Select-element 
fixed strategy 
last-in-first-out ( depth-first search ) 
first-in-first-out ( breadth-first search ) 
on evaluation ( see below ) 
Select-operator 
on necessary and/or sufficient conditions 
must lie on solution path through current-element 
cannot lie on solution path through current-element 
for feasibility 
ease of applicability ( a priori ) 
specialize operator type to apply to current-element 
for desirability 
functional description ( a priori ) 
relevance to difference between current-element and goals 
_specialize operator type to produce goal-like element 
success experience on past problems 
success experience in other parts of the problem space 
for diversity 
systematic generation 
random generation 
specified distribution a/c some operator classification 
Evaluate ( new-element ) 
source of information 
Table 2 ( continued ) 
current problem space 
model of problem space 
experience on past problems 
type of . information 
duplication ( identity ) 
necessary and suffi c ient conditions 
features that must be true for all el ements on 
solution path 
complexity-simplicity 
weighted sum of features to approximate goals or distance 
to goals 
comparison with goals ( differences ) 
comparison with current-element 
expected success 
expected effort 
growth rate of search 
source of criteria 
absolute l imits 
adapted limits from experience with past problems 
upper and lower bounds from tried-problems 
alpha-beta procedure 
branch and bound 
Decide-next-step 
:fixed strategy 
always advance ( depth-first search ) 
always continue ( one-level breadth-first search ) 
always go back ( search and scan ) 
limits 
number of operators ( width ) 
depth of search 
effort and/or space 
on evaluation of new-element ( see above ) 
*
simon and Newell , Human Problem Solving, Table 4 . 1  
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A Resource Allocation Task 
With this information on the basic  processes which are functioning 
as the problem solver generates a solution to a task in general , the spe­
cific task environment will now be analyzed . The problem solver will be 
solving a task in whi ch he is  required to generate a monthly s chedule for 
fourteen individuals ( including himself ) . He will be presented with var­
ious mis s ion requirements which must be fulfilled , bas ic  s chedule param­
eters , and the type and duration of each scheduled activity . This portion 
of the data s et represent s the constraining portion of the problem space . 
The second port ion of  internal data will be compos ed of the re­
vealed preferences of the individuals which the problem s olver will be 
scheduling to meet the constraining area of the problem space . The 
interface between the revealed preferences of the individuals under " sup­
ervision" and the problem constraint s is  the external data .  
The external data will be  constructed in a s imple manner in  order 
to avoid ambiguity as to the causal nature of its effect on the problem.  
The particular type of "noi se" chosen for this study i s  only one of  
.
many 
poss ible combinations which would be of interest in examining the role of 
external nois e  in a subj ect ' s  problem solving behavior . ( For another e�­
ample , see Scientific American , March 1975 . "Interactive Human Communica­
tion" by Alphoz:ise  Chapanis ) 
Table 3 contains the introductory data set for each of the two prob­
lem spaces .  Included in the table is the internal data ( composed of prob­
lem constraints and revealed preferences ) and the ext ernal data ( inter­
face between problem constraints and revealed preferences ) for both prob­
lem spaces .  
/ ,  
Internal 
Data 
Ind .  1 
Ind .  2 
Ind .  3 
Ind .  4 
Ind .  5 
Ind .  6 
Ind .  7 
Ind .  8 
1 .  
2 .  
3 .  
4 .  
5 .  
6 .  
7 .  
8 .  
9. 
10 . 
11 . 
12 . 
13 . 
14 . 
1 5 . 
16 . 
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Table 3 
Introductory Data Sets 
Problem Space 1 
28 days /month 1 .  
14 individuals (paired in 2 .  
groups of two ) 
Week-end days - 1 , 2 , 8 , 9 ,  3 .  
15 , 16 , 17 , 22 , 23 
Training #1 ( 1 )  - 4 , 5 , 6 ,  4 . 
7 , 10 ,11 , 12 , 13 ,14 ,19 ,21 
Training #2 (1) - 4 , 6 , 10 , 5 .  
11 , 13 , 14 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 
Educ . #1 ( 1 ) - 2 ,7 , 12 , 17 ,  6 .  
22 , 27 
Educ . #2 ( 1 ) - 5 ,10 ,15 , 7 .  
20 , 2 5  
Activity # 2  ( 2 )  - all 8 .  
days 
Rest period ( 1 )  - all 9. 
days 
Max . 5 Act . #1/month 10 . 
Max . 2 Weekend Act . #1 11 . 
per month 
Each individual re- 12 . 
quires 1 day each Train-
ing l and 2 
Do not schedule Act . #1 13 . 
"back to back" 
Schedule paired individ- 14 . 
uals simultaneously 
One pair must be 1 5 .  
s cheduled for Act . #1 
each day of month 
Revealed preferences : 16 . 
Al - Problem solver 
A2 - Thursdays off 
Bl - 1 , 13 , 14 , 1 5  off 
B2 - none 
Cl - Weekend alerts 
Educ . #1 
C2 3 alerts only 
Dl Sundays off 
D2 - 7 , 8 ,20 , 21 , 22 off 
Problem Space 2 
28 days /month 
14 individuals ( paired in 
groups o.f two ) 
Week-end days - 1 , 2 , 8 , 9 ,  
1 5  , 16 , 17 , 22· , 23 
Training #1 ( 1 )  - 4 , 5 , 6 ,  
7 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 ,19 ,21 
Training #2 ( 1 )  - 4 , 6 , 10 
11 ,13 ,14 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 
Educ . #1 ( 1 )  - 2 , 7 , 12 ,17 
22 , 27 
Educ . #2 ( 1 ) - 5 , 10 ,15  
. 20 , 25 
Activity #2 ( 2 ) - a.11 
days 
Rest period ( 1 ) - a.11 
days 
Max . 5 Act . #1/month 
Max . 2 Weekend Act . #1 
per month 
Each individaul re­
quires  i day each Train­
ing l and 2 
Do not s chedule Act . #1 
"back to back" 
Schedule paired individ­
uals s imultaneously 
One pair must be 
scheduled for Act . #1 
each day of month 
Revealed preferences : 
Al - Problem solver 
A2 - Thursdays off 
Bl - 1 , 13 , 14 , 15 , off 
B2 - none 
Cl Weekend alerts 
Educ . #1 
C2 - 3 alerts only 
Dl - Sundays off 
D2 - 7 , 8 , 20 , 21 , 22 off 
Internal 
Data 
( cont . ) 
Ind . 9 
Ind . 10 
Ind . 11 
Ind . 12 
Ind. 13 
Ind . 14 
External 
Data 
. Table 3 ( continued ) 
Problem Space 1 
El - Educ . #2 17 off 
E2 - none 
Fl - none 
F2 Educ . #1 
Gl - 7 , 8 , 20 , 21 , 22 off 
27 - birthday 
G2 - Educ . #2 
6 - birthd� 
Ind . 1 - 14 ' s  actual 
name and position 
( Problem solver has avail­
able names and posit ions 
of the individuals under 
his  supervi sion . He has 
previously had associa­
tions with these individ­
uals ; thus , one can assume 
that perceptions concern­
ing each individual are 
present . ) 
Problem Space 2 
El - Educ . #2 17 off 
E2 - none 
Fl - none 
F2 Educ . #1 
Gl - 7 , 8 , 20 , 21 , 22 of 
27 - birthday 
G2 - Educ . #2 
6 - birthday 
"S b 1 °  " t t . ym o ic  represen a ion 
of individuals 1 - 14 . 
( This enables problem 
solver to determine only 
the pairings among his  
14  resource s , but nothing 
more . ) 
Example : Al = Ind . 1 
A2 = Ind . 2 
Bl = Ind . 3 
B2 = Ind . 4 
Cl 
Gl = Ind . 13 
G2 = Ind . 14 
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Chapter 4 
UTILITY 
Throughout this  paper the reader has been subj ected continually to 
the most unfamiliar of economi c terminology --- "sat i s ficing" versus max-
imizing , "limited rationality" versus rationality , "high quality" deci� 
sions versus optimum decisions . The rationale behind this  obvious depar-
ture from traditional concepts of "economic "  man ' s  problem- solving behav-
ior has been discussed previously . It is  now left to introduc e the new 
non-economic concepts into a utility framework in order to  provide a 
measure of  relat ivity between the problem solver ' s  two solution sets . 
This is  not suggesting that measurement be undertaken in its fullest sense , 
since this would imply ( 1 ) that a cardinal ordering system be adopted .and 
( 2 ) that a society welfare function be established which would account 
for weights among the different individuals ' contribution to utility. 
To compare differences between problem spaces in a cardinal-type 
procedure necess itates that the "satisfaction ·measurers "  be faced with a 
significantly large dilemma ;  that being 
they may want to measure satisfactions because it i s  
thought that they determine behaviour . They would almost cer­
tainly have to admit , if satisfactions were measured in a way 
that was independent of behaviour , that they did not after all 
determine behaviour . Or they would say that the ' satisfac­
tions ' ,  that had been in some sense ad�ed , were not the other 
of thes e  things , because it is  clear from introspection that 
one ' s actions are not solely determined by feelings of satis­
faction . 
The alternative motive for adding satisfactions springs , 
of course , from ethics . Most people would agree that it is  a 
good thing to make someone happier • . I f  it is  thought that hap­
piness  consists of satis factions , then how nice it would be if 
we could measure them . But suppose we could measure satisfac­
tions . Then either people would give up the naive idea that 
happiness cons ists of feelings of satisfaction , and cease to 
. ...  
f J  
maintain that o�e ought to try to maxJ.mize s atisfactions , 
or they would say that the satisfaction which was the end 
of right conduct was not the satisfaction that these scien­
tists  measured . Suppose that it was considered immoral to 
feel feverish , but that there were no thermometers . Then 
thermometers are invented , and one is said to be feveri sh 
i f  one ' s  temperature is  higher than 98 . 4  degrees F .  Are 
people going to submit to being told that it is  immoral 
to have a temperature? They are far more likely either to 
say that the thermometer does not measure one ' s  real feel­
ings , or to cease to say that feverishness i s  immoral . We 
can be fairly certain that something similar would happen 
if  it became poss ible to measure satis faction . 5 
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Additionally , measurement of community welfare from problem space to prob-
lem space can not be undertaken due to the inability of the problem solv-
er , and the researcher , to functionally represent the total utility of the 
community without applying weights to each individual member of the com-
munity as his individual utility relates to the community welfare . Rather , 
the welfare of each individual will be analyzed in each problem space in-
dependent of the other members of the community . Thus , the utility func-
tion will be composed of an ordinal ranking system with respect to each 
independent individual . 
This approach is convenient and proper because ( 1 ) ordinal ranking 
is simpler than cardinal ranking , ( 2 ) all important conclusions on the 
welfare of the community ( i . e . , the problem solver ' s  human inputs ) can be 
reached , and (3 ) that no different conclusions follow from using a cardin-
al , community welfare system over the proposed ordinal system .  
I n  order t o  circumvent many o f  the remaining difficulti es present 
when measuring satisfaction ( thi s is , after all , the situation facing 
511ttle ,  A Critique of Welfare Economics , P ·  33 . 
the problem solver : to "satisfy" the requests of his human resources ) ,  
one c an employ the ordinal ranking function to measure uti lity in  terms 
of "chosen position" , not in terms of satisfaction . Thus , if  a certain 
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chosen posit ion in the problem space is achieved ( and has assoc iated with 
it greater utility than some other position ) , one may say that achieving 
this chosen position is  evidence for an individual being more "satisfied" . 
Functional Form 
Pragmatically , one can state that no ill consequences in analys is  
will arise  if  the  problem solver does not have an exact , functional rep-
resentation of the utility fUnction in mind as he i s  solving the task 
presented him ; in fact , it is irrelevant as to · the exact nature of the 
function so long as the problem solver is aware of hi s goal s in reaching 
a solution . I f  the problem solver perceives that he i s  faced with ( and 
has a representation of ) a utility function , then thi s will lead him to 
a satisficing final solution . In both problem spaces the preferences of 
the indivi duals being s cheduled are avai lable for reference , and it is 
shown in the actual protocol that these preferences are cons i dered . 
t " h • t •  " f h These revealed preferences represen c osen pos1  ions or  eac 
individual , and the problem solver is faced with a task of meeting as many 
of these preferences as pos sible . A final solution whi ch i s  consi stent 
with these "chosen positions " will be of greater utility than a final solu­
tion which neglects the revealed preferences . In fact , one can asstnne that , 
in an abstract s ense , he problem solver may choose any solution s et along 
the continuum from recogni zing all . of the revealed preferences  to 
recogni zing none o f  them. How the problem solver ' s  perception of the 
revealed preferences is ultimately mani fested in the final· solution set 
will be the topi c of  later di s cussion . 
Nature of the Utility Function 
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To complete the di scuss ion of utility , the following statements on 
the nature of the utility function can be made : 
( 1 ) Many act iviti es scheduled during a given month may have no 
effect On tge " chosen pos ition" associated with an individual ' s  
revealed preferences . 
( 2 ) Any pos ition in the utility matrix which has no effect on the 
" chosen pos ition" of a given individual wi ll be as signed a value 
of zero ( 0 ) . 
( 3 ) Any " chosen position" which is  not "satisfied" will be assigned 
a value of zero ( 0 ) in the utility matrix . 
( 4 ) Any " chosen position" which is " sati s fi ed" wi.11 be ass igned a 
value of one ( 1 ) . 
( 5 ) Evaluation of  the problem solver ' s  performance in the two di f­
ferent problem spaces will be based on the relative utilities of 
each individual independently of all other individuals . 
Note the following example : 
Example : 
Problem Space 
#1 
Problem 
Space 
#2 
where , 
u1 
U2 
= 
U11 ,1  U12 , l  • • • • UlN 1 
U21 ,1 U22 - • • • • U2N ' 1  , 
UKl ,l  UK2 , l  • • • • UKN 1 
U11 , 2  U12 , 2 · · · · UlN 2 = U21 , 2  U22 ,2 · · · · U2N : 2  
• 
UKl 2 , UK2 2 • • • . , UKN 2 
Ind . #1 : u l , N , l � u l ,N ,2 
Ind . #2 : u 2 ,N , 1 ,....__, u 2 ,N , 2  
Ind . #3 : U3 ,N , l  ,......_, U3 ,N , 2  
Ind . #K : UK N 1 , , 
N = 1 , 2 ,  • • •  , 28 
with UK N S · , , ' 
UK N i s  the utility as sociat ed 
with a specific activity being 
scheduled on the Nth day for the 
Kth individual as perceived by 
the problem solver . 
S designates a given problem space 
� = compared to 
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Thus , the evaluat ion of performance is on an individual basis . 
One may say that if  the final solution for Problem Space #1 
yields more for Ind . #1 than the utility associated with Prob-
lem Space #2 , then Problem Space #1 represents a better final 
solution for Ind . #1 . 
( 6 ) As this particular task environment has guiding documents 
which dictate that all individuals must be treated equally and 
equitably , with regard to their preferences , then the higher 
quality solution ( between the two final solutions ) may be de-
termined by the solution which has the greater number of indi-
viduals in "chosen pos itions" ( i . e . , more preferences met ) � 
Example : 
u l ,N ,X 
u 2 , N ,X 
u 3 ,N ,X 
U4 ,N ,X 
u 5 ,N ,Y 
i s  
i s  
is  
is  
is  
pref erred to 
pref erred to 
pref erred to 
pref erred to 
pref erred to 
u l ,N ,Y where 
u N=l , 2 , • • •  , 2 8  
2 ,N ,Y 
u 
3 ,N ,Y 
U4 ,N ,Y 
u 5 ,N , X 
Thus it may be stated that the solution reached in Problem Space 
X is superior to the solution reached in Problem Space Y ,  because 
more individuals believe that the solution of  Problem Space X 
yielded higher utility than the solution of Problem Space Y .  
This  "maj ority rules" concept would not normally be valid , for it 
is_ l.mpossible to say that each individual in the community has 
equal weight in deciding which alternative is  best . However ,  as 
this particular task environment dictates that " all · individuals 
be treated equally" , then this type of deci s ion-evaluation may be con­
sidered appropri ate . 
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Chapter 5 
ALLOCATION TASK : BEHAVIOR OF A SINGLE SUBJECT 
As was shown in Chapter 3, the problem solver (henceforth , S-1 ) 
. .  
was given the task o f  solving two allocation problems i n  which the ex-
ternal data varied . Problem Space #1 contained the "noise"  variable of 
providing the names and rank of each individual . It was postulated that 
this noise is  not filtered out by problem solvers in general and that it 
adversely affects the final solution in terms of  revealed preferences not 
being met . The actual protocol for the Problem Space #1 was not recorded 
in order to eliminate the "Hawthorne effect " ( see Western Electric studies 
on Hawthorne ass embly plant ) . However , the final solution is  available 
and is given in Table 4 .  With thi s solution set i s  associated a Utilit
.
Y 
Matrix u1 whi ch measures the number of revealed pre ferences whi ch were met 
by the subj ect S-1 in Problem Space #1 . ( Table 5 ) 
An example of how thi s utility matrix was formulated may be seen 
by focusing on Ind . # 5 .  This individual ' s  re�ealed preference was for 
"weekend activity #1" . As only one day ( 2nd) for activity #1 was on a 
weekend , position u5 , 2 has a one ( 1 ) inserted . This represents a degree 
ot satisfaction , for it meets Ind . #5 ' s  "chosen pos ition" . All other en­
tries for Ind . # 5  are zero ( 0 ) , indicating that no other " chosen pos itions"  
were met . This identical procedure was performed for each individual and 
m� be verified by comparing the revealed preferences listed in the_ Intro­
ductory data. s et with the final solution set . 
�oblem Space #2 
Problem Space #2 eliminated the names and ranks of each of the in­
dividuals and substituted symbols which were said to app
roximate a null 
Table 4 
Final Solution Set for Problem Space Hl 
* * * * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15  16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25  26 27 28 
Johnson A A 0 T2 Tl A A 0 
Fellows A A 0 T2 Tl A A 0 
Reynolds T2 A A 0 Tl A A 0 A A 0 A 
Scott T2 A A 0 Tl A A 0 A A 0 A 
Grimm A A 0 Tl A A 0 T2 A A 0 
Stevenson A A 0 Tl A A 0 T2 A A 0 
Farrell 0 E . Tl A A 0 E E A A 0 A A 0 E T2 E A A 0 
Sanders Tl A A 0 A A 0 A A 0 T2 A A 0 
Brothers E A A 0 E Tl A A 0 E T2 A A 0 A A 0 
Hanson A A 0 Tl A A 0 T2 A A 0 A A 0 
Oliver E A A 0 Tl T2 A A 0 A A 0 E A A _ O  ._ E 
Rose A A 0 Tl T2 A A 0 A A 0 A A 0 
C�rter A A 0 T2 A A  0 Tl A A 0 A A 
Benton A A 0 T2 E E A A  0 E Tl A A 0 E A A 
( All names are fictitious ) 
.i:::-
1--' 
A 
B 
c 
U1 = 
D 
E 
F 
\ 
G 
Table 5 
Utility Matrix for Problem Space #1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 1 0  11 12 13 14 15  16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 oa 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 oa 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 O · O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
a = Assume Problem Solver and his deputy ( Ind . #2 )  have no revealed preferences . 
+:­
f\) 
43 
set , thus eliminating the key noise variable ( name and rank ) which was 
postulated to be a source of distortion in the subj ect ' s  problem solving 
behavior in Problem Space #1 . 
The protocol of S-1 solving Problem Space #2 i s  given in Table 6 .  
Adj acent to the protocol are notes which emphasi ze speci al protocols and 
point out key processes . The Inferred Productions column of the Sample 
Protocol ( Table 1 )  has been purposefully deleted from S-l ' s  protocol on 
the computer . Instead , "Notes" describing the protocols have been listed 
in this column . 
The final solution set for Problem Space #2 is  shown in Table 7 .  
The utility matrix ( U  ) assoc iated with Problem Space #2 i s  shown in 
Table 8 .  
Comparative Rankines 
With the utility of each Problem Space solution tabulated , one need 
only determine whi ch Final Solution is preferred by the maj ority of indi­
viduals ( in terms of preferences met ) . As prescribed in Chapter 4 ,  this 
may be accomplished by comparing the utility assoc iated with each problem 
space solution for each individual independent of all other individuals . 
This compari son will involve simple introspection of the two utility mat­
rices to determine which matrix has met the greater number of "chosen po­
sitions" ( as i ndicated by one ( 1 )  in an �lement of the matrix ) .  In  
summation : 
u3 , N  1 
i s  indifferent to u 3 , N , 2 
u is  indifferent to 
u 
4 ,N 1 4 , N , 2  
u9 ,N 1 
i s  indifferent to u 9 ,N , 2 
Phase 
Number 
Bl 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
B6 
B7 
B8 
B9 
BlO 
Bll 
Bl2 
Bl3 
Bl4 
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Table 6 
Protocol for Subj ect Sl on Simple Allocat ion Task 
Protocol 
The first thing I do is 
figure out what the people 
want 
particularly in education , 
I mark an E in the days 
they want to have there , 
Since you gave me specific 
days . 
But anyway , will use E ' s  
for this . 
13 , 14 , 15 . 
OK , this i s  Bravo . 
Bl , to be exact . 
OK , now , Delta , D2 there 
has a requirement for edu­
cation ; too , also 
7 and 8, he ' s  got an E 
plus the 20 - 22 • • • 
he wants off the 17 ( El )  
and h e  has 2 education days 
E - days are up here . 
Notes 
As was postulated , . the goal 
is to meet revealed prefer­
ences subj ect to constraints . 
Each individual was assigned 
to an education group . 
Problem solver is  scheduling 
Bl ' s  revealed preferences . 
Misunderstanding ; the " 2" 
meant second preference ,  not 
education days . Clarificat.ion 
made 
E - days ref er to education 
days ; up here refers to top of 
page 
.,,.. 
. .... 
Phase 
Number 
Bl5 
Bl6 
Bl7 
Bl8 
Bl9 
B20 
B21 
B22 
B23 
B24 
B25 
B26 
B27 
Table 6 ( continued ) 
Protocol 
OK , I didn ' t  see that . 
OK , then on Echo . He pre­
fers to have the 17 off , 
that ' s  E-1 , 
and I put a dash in the 
17 
just to remind mys elf I 
shouldn ' t  have him do any­
thing on that day , 
and he also has 2 E-days , 
OK , that ' s  good enough , 
so he ( El )  has education 
on the 5 ,  10 , 15 , 20 , and 
2 5 . 
Oh , I ' ll switch E-days to 
section 2 
since El wants the night 
of the 17 off . 
7 ,  1 2 , 17 , 22 , and 27 
now thi s guy • • •  
E2 does not have anything , 
Notes 
Prime example of S-1 making 
every effort to meet all 
revealed preferences . 
Same misunderstanding as Bl3 . 
Education days involve only 
daytime activities . 
·-,. 
> 
Phase 
Number 
B28 
B29 
B30 
B31 
B32 
B33 
B34 
B35 
B36 
B37 
B38 
B39 
B40 
B41 
B42 
46 
Table 6 ( cont inued ) 
Protocol 
course  now , F2 ' s  going to 
have E-days 
and he ' ll take the 2nd 
period instead of the 1st • • •  
5 ,  10 , 15 , 20 , and 25  
I 
and these  guys here in Gulf 
one ' s  in UNC and 
one has E-days 
OK , that ' s  fair , 
so  I ' ll do the guy ( El )  on 
7 ,  8 ,  20 thru 22 , 
OK , and he ' s  ( E2 )  got E 
days 
Section 1 or 2?  
Which would be best? 
Uh ,  I think , uh ,  either 
one doesn ' t  make much 
di fference • • •  
I ' ll give him Section 2 • • •  
OK , let me see i f  I got 
all the requirements down . 
OK , I ' ve still got 27 and 
26 for Gulf 
Notes 
UNC is education program 
S-1 makes value j udgements .t 
such as thi s , throughout . 
Pos s ible attempt at optimi zing . 
' Sati s fic ing ' behavior seems 
to prevail :  the a.mount of data 
available doe s  not lend it­
self to ready analys i s .  
S-1 i s  checking t o  see i f  any 
revealed preferences were not 
scheduled . 
Phase 
Number 
B43 
B44 
B45 
B46 
B47 
B48 
B49 
B50 
B51 
B52 
B53 
BS4 
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Table 6 ( continued )  
Protocol 
Well , some of these may 
not work out • • •  
but we ' ll see i f  we can 
Not too bad 
Let me see i f  there ' s  any­
thing I ' ve mi ssed • • •  
Now I ' m doing this when 
I start programming Act . I  
It ' s  not a one-shot deal 
There ' s  a little erasing 
done • • •  
He ( Charlie ) want s 3 Act . I  
all on weekends • • •  
Notes  
In  B43/B44 it i s  clear that 
there exists no interface 
between the problem space and 
the internal representation 
S-1 evaluating his  performance 
Revealed preferences  now are 
all s cheduled ;  education and 
preferenti al days off 
A statement . 
S-1 is  aware that he has no 
nathematical algorithm avail­
able to s chedule Act . l  Also , 
that a heuri sti c-search pro­
ces s  i s  required . 
Failure , occasionally , i s  
expected . 
S-1 begins with Act . I  prefer� 
erce s . 
We ' ll start off with day 1 Heuri sti c proce s s  begins for 
generating A ct . 1 .  
OK , Bravo went out on the 
2nd 
and Charlie went out on the 
1st , s o  far 
Phase 
Number 
B55 
B56 
B57 
B58 
B59 
B60 
B61 
B62 
B63 
B64 
B65 
B66 
B67 
B68 
B69 
4 8  
Table 6 ( continued ) 
Protocol 
Charlie went out because 
he wants weekends 
and that ' s  ( day 1 )  a 
Saturday , 
and that ' s  a good weekend 
Act . 1 
cause we consider Fridays 
and Saturdays weekend Act . 
1 
Sunday we do not . 
The other guy ( Bravo ) said 
he had an education day on 
the 1st 
Notes 
S-1 must re fer to problem con­
straints in order to meet Act . 
l preference s .  
Not a weekend Act . 1 .  
an d  therefore he was open , For Act . 1 on the 2nd 
and he did get the 1st off.  S-1 is considering both re­
vealed preferences and prob­
lem constraints simultaneously 
All right , now we ' ve got 
to come down here 
for the 3rd • • •  
3rd • • •  
there ' s  nobody here • • •  
1st , 2nd , OK • • •  
we ' re going to put a guy 
out here on the 4th . 
Here , that ' s  Echo , 
Failed at thi s time to find 
a pair to be s cheduled on the 
3rd 
Phase 
Number 
B70 
B71 
B72 
B73 
B74 
B75 
B76 
B77 
B78 
B79 
B80 
B81 
Table 6 ( continued ) 
Protocol 
that ' s  so he can get an 
E-day without a rest day 
conf'used 
and hopefully , I �an put • • •  
where is  this guy ( Bravo ) , 
he doesn ' t  like the 3rd 
that much , 
I am going to  switch , uh • • •  
Gulf is  going to go out on 
the 2nd ,  instead of Bravo 
Bravo will go out on the 
3rd 
Now I ,  supposedly , have 
programmed through the 4th 
Now I ' ve got to find the 
5th 
Notes 
See note for B62 . 
Notice that as S-1 makes 
satisfic ing dec isions , he 
remains aware of the re­
vealed preferences . 
OK , uh , Fox i s  going out on S-1 is  solving the eas iest 
the 6th subproblems first , then he 
ascends to more di fficult 
problems . 
( the checkmarks at the top Clari ficat ion 
of' the columns mean that 
someone has previously been 
s cheduled for Act . l on this 
day )  
Oh 1 i s  that what that means ?  
'r 
- .... 
Phase 
Number 
B8.2 
B83 
B84 
B85 
B86 
B87 
B88 
B89 
B90 
B91 
B92 
B93 
5 0 
Table 6 ( continued)  
Protocol 
Oh , I ' ve got somebody pro­
grammed already then , 
OK , excuse me , all right , 
hmmm • • •  
we may switch right from 
the beginning again ? • • •  
Notes 
You got day 6,  7,  and 8 OK • •  
then Fox can ' t  go out on 
that day , supposedly , 
that ' s  the 3rd • • •  
Try to fi gure out when we 
can program to utili ze him 
(Fox ) • • •  
by thi s method , he can go 
out on the 11th , 
and to equali ze the Act . 
l ' s  • • • 
I have to schedule T-1 , 
too , right? • • •  
OK , just for a check , 
he ( Fox ) can go out the 
11th 
In B81 - B87 , S-1 appears to 
be searching for a subproblem 
which he can readily solve . 
S-1 has discovered a sub­
problem which he can solve . 
In B88 - B93 , S-1 appears to 
be alternatively placing in­
ternal data into memory and 
searching for a subproblem 
which he c an s olve . 
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Table 6 ( continued) 
Phase 
Number 
B94 
B95 
B96 
B97 
B98 
B99 
Protocol 
Uh oh , the 16th , someone ' s  
got it already • • •  
Oh , is  the 17th a holiday? 
OK , yeah , there ' s  the 
holiday ,  OK , thi s man can 
go out the 17th • • •  
and he ( Fox ) can go out the 
28th , the last day of the 
month , 
and he ( Fox ) can hit thi s 
one ( 27th ) 
he ( Fox ) can go out the 
27th 
BlOO the 24th is taken 
BlOl and the 23rd • • • 
Bl02 I would also check , I ' m 
certain it is  going to 
take 4 Activities per 
person 
Bl03 I am also  checking to see 
the weekends , so that they 
are equal . 
Bl04 Course , uh ,  certain people 
wanted weekends , and that 
was Crew • • •  
Bl05 oh , the first crew , Charlie 
Notes 
S-1 has skipped a portion of 
the problem space , deciding 
that he will wo rk in descend­
ing order of Act . l  as signment 
. '  .. 
J 
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Table 6 ( continued) 
Phas e 
Number Protocol 
Bl06 OK , • • •  OK , we got day 1 ,  
2 ,  3 ,  4 • • • 
Bl07 Big Daddy ( S-1 ) will go 
out the 5th 
Bl08 I usually go out on a 
Thursday , I am the Alpha , 
Bl09 the 6th is  completed 
BllO the 7th is done 
Blll now I ' ve got to find the 
8th , 
Bll2 OK • • •  he ( Charlie )  wants 
all weekend Act . 1 
Bll3 hm ,  he ' s  only allowed to 
have three , though , 
Bll4 
Bll5 
Bll6 
Bll7 -
Bll8 
he doesn ' t  really have to 
take that one , 
OK , I give that ( the 8th ) 
offhand to Echo , 
. OK , the 9th • • •  
let ' s  see , the 11th is  
taken 
so  I put Bravo out on the 
10th , 
Notes 
Between B88 and Bl07 , it  
appears that S-1 has in­
ternali zed a much greater 
proportion of  the problem 
space . 
S-1 i s  attempting to  equali ze 
Charli e ' s  di stribution of 
Act . 1 over the entire month . 
Phase 
Number 
119 
Bl20 
Bl21 
Bl22 
Bl23  
Bl24 
Bl25 
Bl26 
Bl27 
Bl28 
Bl29 . 
Bl30 
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Table 6 ( continued ) 
Protocol 
because he ' s  got UNC on the 
13th , whi ch will bring him 
back on the 12th 
Notes 
and therefore I won ' t  have See B62 . 
to worry about scheduling 
him for anything while he ' s  
going to s chool . 
and it puts him right 
next to where he is  going 
to go off • • •  
the 10th • • •  
the 9th , that ' s  still a 
problem , 
I ' ve got a problem with 
thi s  guy ( Gulf ) down here • • •  
oh , no , I ' ve got the 
10th • • •  
the 9th • • • 
I got · the 8th , OK • • •  
well , here ' s  one , I missed 
. him , 
OK, Delta hasn ' t  had any 
Act . l ' s  yet 
and he can go out on the 
9th real easily ,  because 
he j ust  finished his E­
day , 
S-1 states "Eureka! "  He has 
finally dis covered that Delta 
has not been considered for 
s cheduling Act . 1 .  
Table 6 ( continued ) 
Phase 
Number Protocol 
Bl31 and that will be hi s fi rst 
Act . 1 for the month . 
Bl32 So now I ' m up through the 
10th , 
Bl33 and maybe even through the 
llth . 
Bl34 Yes , I ' m up through the 
11th. 
Bl35 An easy 12th is coming up 
right down here to Gulf. 
Notes 
Bl36 Again , lucki ly , he gets See B62 . 
his E-day the day after a 
rest Day . 
Bl37 So let ' s  see , I ' m getting 
down the road here • • •  
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. B138 an Act . 1, I need one on 
the 15th 
S-1 is  now beginning to gen­
erate · a new s et of subproblems 
Bl39 And somebody wanted week­
end activities 
Bl40 and I ' ll give them a 2nd 
( Act . 1 ) and that is  • • •  
Charlie  
Bl41 so I ' ve · still got the 13th 
and 14th open • • •  
Bl42 uh ,  the 14th looks real 
good to go to Delta , 
Bl43 because he doesn ' t  get a 
back-to-back on activities 
5 5  
Table 6 ( continued ) 
Phas e 
Number Protocol Notes 
Bl44 and he is  going to be able Bl43/Bl44 See B62 . 
to fill in all hi s , uh • • •  
Bl45 looks like it might work 
out , 
Bl46 uh • • •  a pos sible rethought 
is , 
Bl47 I might have to change this 
with Echo for the 13th and 
14th 
Bl4 8 on the grounds I may want 
to s lip them in 2 Act . l ' s  
in a period there 
Bl49 but I doubt it . 
Bl50 We ' ll find out when I get 
up here ( 23rd ) . 
Bl51 OK , the 15th is done , 
Bl52 the 16th , 
Bl53 the 17th is  done , 
Bl54 now I got to find the 
18th • • •  
Bl55  Ah , we ' re really going 
downhill ; 
Bl56 OK , that ' s  going to put 
him to four • • •  
Bl57 this guy ' s  got only two • • •  
S-1 is  leaving a contingency 
path open in cas e  he is  un.able 
to fill Act . l ' s  in the 17th 
through the 23rd. 
Table 6 ( continued ) 
Phase 
Number 
Bl58  
Bl59 
Bl60 
B161 
B162 
B163 
B164 
B165 
Protocol 
OK , • • • 1 ,  2 ,  
You ' re really giving me a 
tough one here • • •  
1 ,  2 ,  3 ,  4 ,  OK , I 'm count­
ing Fox 
• • •  OK , the 16th is given , 
I can ' t  give Gulf to the 
16th becaus e we ' ve got it 
covered • • •  
the 17th • • •  
well , equal i zation of 
alerts , hmm • • •  
it ' s  pos sible , I ' m not 
s aying thi s is true , but 
i t ' s  pos sible Gulf may 
mi s s  an education day . 
B166 One of the fellows may 
mis s  an E-day . 
B167 And it totally depends on • •  
B168 well , we don ' t  want to do 
that either • • •  
Bl69 uh ,  the last weekend ac­
tivity I got is the 22nd 
and 23rd. 
B170 OK , so ,  day 21 is covered ,  
Notes 
Bl56 - Bl60 : 
equity . 
S-1 is  checking 
This i s  the fi rst time that 
S-1 has mentioned that pos­
sibly one of the revealed 
preferences may not be met . 
S-1 states another "Eureka! "  
Bl71 excus e  me , 22nd is covered , Bravo has been s cheduled for 
21st isn ' t  the 22nd.  
Table 6 ( continued ) 
Phase 
Number Protocol 
Bl72 This  will fi ll out the 
three Act . l ' s  for Bravo 
Bl73 and we will have completed 
his requirements , 
Bl74 plus getting his E-days 
so far . 
Bl75 OK , I got to find the 18th , 
19th , and 20th . · 
Bl76 Now I prefer to go out on 
a Wednesday 
Bl77 so we ' re going to go on 
the 19th , 
Bl78 the reason being that I go 
to school on Tuesday night 
and do not like to mis s  that 
particular day .  
Bl79 So we got to find the 
18th • • •  
Bl80 l ,  2 ,  3 ,  4 • • •  
Bl81 well , we ' ll try him out at 
least • • •  
Bl82 I gave the 18th to Echo , 
Bl83 the 19th is  covered • • •  
Bl84 uh oh , I as signed , excuse 
me , the weekend activity 
guy, 
Notes 
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Phase 
Number 
Bl85 
Bl86 · 
Bl87 
Bl88 
Bl89 
Bl90 
Bl91 
Bl92 
Bl93 
Bl94 
Table 6 ( continued ) 
Protocol 
I have to drop down the 
2 1st  to Charlie ,  
I got them backwards 
there , 
so Bravo will go out on 
the 20th . 
At thi s time now , I ' ve 
got 2 Act . l ' s  for �.yself, 
3 activities for the 
second guy ,  
I can go to four on him, 
( that ' s  Bravo ) , 
I got three activities , 
all weekends , for Charlie ,  
Delta • • •  I only got two 
. Act . 1 1  s 
and there fore , he ' s  got 
the 23rd , 
an d  that will give him 
three Act . l ' s  • • •  
Notes 
In Bl79 - Bl87 , it  is again 
apparent that S-1 has very 
little internali zation 
of the external data ( i . e . , 
Al ,  A2 ,  Bl , B2 , Cl • • • ) He i s  
aware of  the revealed prefer­
ences , but has not made an 
association between these 
preferences and the external 
data set . 
S-1 began in Bl88 comparing 
equity in the problem space , 
but a higher priority , fin d­
ing a crew to t ake the 23rd , 
was recogni zed . 
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Table 6 ( continued ) 
Phase 
Number Protocol 
Bl95 The 24th is  covered • • •  
Bl96 the 25th • • •  
Bl97 hmm , 1 ,  2 ,  • • •  
Bl98 I ' m still hurtin� on the 
bottom guy 
Bl99 OK , I ' ll just have to 
worry about him in a 
minute here • • •  
B200 25th • • • 
B201 the 26th , I can give to 
Bravo 
B202 Let me j ust try this for 
a s econd here , 
B203 that will give him (Bravo ) 
four Act . l ' s .  
B204 Of cours e the goal , as we 
know , i s  four Act . l ' s  
B205 plus I get only 2 
B206 Ah ,  he ' s  ( Charlie ) not 
allowed to have any . 
B207 OK , the 26th • • •  
B208 the 27th • • •  
Notes 
In Bl94 - B201 , S-1 is now 
comparing equity again.  
As problem solving of Act . 1 
nears completion , S-1 becomes 
more involved with the con­
straints . 
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Table 6 ( continued ) 
Phase 
Number 
B209 
B210 
B211 
B212 
B213 
B214 
B215 
B216 
Protocol 
now thi s guy ( Delta 1 ) 
has a requirement , 
he likes Sundays off. 
I blew it on him once so 
far , but we ' ll find. out 
i f  it  can be changed • • •  
oh no , I already got the 
27th • • •  
the 28th is  a • • •  oh , it 
happens to be a Friday 
OK , so he ( Delta ) wants 
off Sunday , 
he ' ll go out on the 27th , 
and the 28th will be 
switched to Fox . 
B217 Of course , that ' s  · not very 
good either . 
B218 What I may have to do here 
now • • •  
B219 OK , now I got to figure 
out what days I 'm mi s s ing 
B220 and equalize Act . l ' s ,  
B221 because one of them is  
very bad , by  the way . 
Notes 
Fox is switched from the 27th 
to the 2 8th. 
J 
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Table 6 ( continued ) 
Phase 
Number 
B222 
B223 
Protocol 
Of course , I may be only 
able to give certs.in 
people three Act . l ' s  a 
month , too . 
But somebody can ' t  end 
up with two . 
B224 OK , Delta likes Sundays 
o"ff. 
B225 Now I happened to schedule 
Delta on a Sunday 
B226 but he got a rest day on 
a Sunday 
B227 and he goes out on a Sun­
day , 
B228 so that ' s  not very good 
B229 H i s  9th is OK 
Notes 
S-1 is concerned about equal­
i zation o f  A ct .  l ' s , as he i s  
bound by regulation to do . 
S-1 realizes that he has not 
done as well meeting Dl ' s  
preferences as he di d on 
every one els e ' s  preferences . 
B230 but you got to figure you "Satisfi cing" behavior . 
got to los e  them once in 
. a while . 
B231 Pos s ibly , I will switch 
him ( Delta)  and drop him 
down to three Act . l ' s , 
B232 by removing the 23rd and 
dropping it down . 
I 
Table 6 ( continued ) 
Phase 
Number Protocol 
B233 An d  even though he ' ll 
( Gulf )  have to switch an 
E-day • • •  
B234 OK , I got to veri fy now 
where I stand. 
B235 OK , Gulf - 3 ,  Fox - 4 ,  
Echo - 4 ,  
B236 and it looks like I cov­
ered everything . for him 
( Delta)  • • •  
B237 OK , I lost one Stmday 
activity 
B238 the Sunday comes on a 
rest day 
B239 did A-#1 on Charlie 
B240 and Bravo , he ' s  in good 
shape 
B241 Now , I got to veri fy I 
got everJ day covered , 
B242 I don ' t  think I covered 
the 26th offhand • • •  
B243 what di d thi s guy want? 
B244 He had only three Act . l ' s  
• • •  
B245 this guy • • •  
B246 26th , 26th , 26th • • •  
Notes 
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Table 6 ( continued ) 
Phase 
Nmnber 
B247 
B24 8  
Protocol 
I am swit ching , veri fy 
this , the 28th Act . 1 out 
of Fox to Echo 
and giving the 26th Act . 1 
to Fox . 
B249 Now , Echo has five , Bravo 
has three , Charlie has 
three , Delta has three , 
but can ' t  take the 28th • • •  
B250 Fox has four , Gulf has 
four • • • 
B251 OK , Bravo can take the 
Act . 1 on the 28th 
B2 52 so now I ' ll switch the 
28th Act . 1 from Echo to 
Bravo . 
B253 There , that ' s  better . 
B254 Now , I ' ll veri f'y I got 
all the days down here . 
B255 1 - Charlie ,  2 - Bulf ,  
3 - B ravo , 4 - Echo , 
5 - Alpha , 6 - taken , 
1 - taken , 8 - Echo , 
9 - Delta , 10 - Bravo , 
11 - Fox , 12 - Gulf , 
Notes 
In B234 - B24 8 , S-1 spent a 
maj ority of hi s time checking 
the quality of hi s problem 
space . In B246 , it i s  likely · 
that several generate-and­
test procedures were carried 
out , making pos s ible the 
" switch" . . 
S-1 reali zed hi s error in 
as signing Echo with five 
Act .  l ' s .  
Table 6 ( continued)  
Phase 
Number Protocol 
13 - Echo , 14 - Delta , 
1 5  - Charlie , 16 -- taken 
17 - Fox , 18 - Echo , 19 -
Alpha , 20  - Bravo , 21 -
Charlie , 22 - Fox , 23 -
Gul f ,  24 - taken , 25 -
Bravo , 26 - Fox , 27 -
Delta , 28 - Bravo . 
B256 There , I think I met 
everybody ' s  requirements • • •  
B257 except one guy , who ' s  
supposed to be off on a 
Sunday . 
B258 
B259 
He has an o-day on a 
Sunday .  
OK , figuring myself ,  I 
got to be a the end of 
the month ( chuckle ) .  
B260 All ri ght , OK , I myself , 
I ' ll take T-1 on the 14th . 
B261 Bravo will get it on the 
6th • • • 
B262 no , that ' s  no good , 
B263 I ' d rather have him out • • • 
B264 OK , 4 ,  5 , 6 ,  7 ,  10 , 11 , 
12 , 13 , 14 .  19 , 21 • • •  
Notes 
Act . l ' s  s cheduling now 
complete . 
S-1 i s  now beginning to 
s chedule T-1 . 
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Table 6 ( continued ) 
Phase 
Number Protocol 
B265 I ' d rather see him take 
it  on the 19th , 
B266 because he has Act . 1 
on the next day • • •  � 
B267 
B268 
uh ,  the 4th , the 5th , 
looks like the 5th for 
Charlie , 
B269 and. the 4th for Delta. 
B270 They have free blocks for 
that period , and certain 
prerequi s ites : 
B271 I will not schedule it 
( T-1 ) after a rest day , 
B272 
B273 
B274 
B275 
B276 
B277 
and they ' re pretty wi de 
open during this period 
of' the month 
Now we ' re going to have 
a tough one ( Echo ) 
uh ,  where am I ?  • • •  
the 2lst , • • •  the 11th 
Well , we got one thing 
I 'm going to have to break 
here . 
It looks like I will have 
to give one crew ( training ) 
af'ter a rest day , 
Notes 
S-1 has revealed his generate­
and-test constraints whi ch he · 
feels provide equity . 
'!· 
_ .. 
• 
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Table 6 ( continued )  
Phase 
Number Protocol 
B278 due to the fact that they 
have only two open peri ods , 
B279 
B280 
B281 
B282 
B283 
B284 
B285 
B286 
so  they won ' t  have to lose 
education or anything else 
so they eat it there ( 21st ) . 
Fox has an open period at 
the beginning of the month 
and the 6th i s  open 
so we ' ll give it to them 
on the 6th 
and las t but not least , 
we ought to s ee about the 
9th , i s  the 9th open? 
Yes , the 10th , the 11th , 
• • • 
B287 Nobody took it on the 
11th? • • •  
B288 They ' ll take it on the 
11th - Gulf.  
Notes 
In B277 - B279 , S-1 exhibits 
the lack o f  internali z ation 
of nois e  vari ables ( such as 
interpersonal con flicts ) .  He  
explains that Echo ' s  revealed 
preferen ces are more important 
than his own established 
s cheduling constraints . 
Table 6 ( continued)  
Phase 
Number Protocol 
B289 There ' s  only one guy 
( Echo ) I feel bad about 
on T-1 . 
B290 
B291 
B292 
B293 
B294 
B295 
B296 
B297 
B298 
B299 
But the percentages are 
pretty good.  
T-2 - • • •  
I ' ll schedule myself on 
the . 10th , 
no parti cular reason , 
except I ' m open then 
pretty eas i ly that week . 
I like to get my things 
over in one shot . 
All right , the 6th , 11th , 
10th , 9th 1 no , can ' t  do it  
then , 
he ' s  got the 19th , 
how about the 1 8th? 
Yeah , good , OK , Bravo ' s  
going t o  take it on the 
18th . 
B300 That ' s  a good open period 
for them. 
B301 Now we ' re coming into 
Charli e , 
B302 that ' s  pretty easy to 
s chedule all the way around. 
Notes 
S-1 has completed s cheduling 
T-1 . 
S-1 i s  now b eginning to 
s chedule T-2 . 
In B296 - 299 , S-1 i s  
searching for a day i n  whi ch 
Bravo may attend T-2 . 
.> 
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Table 6 ( continued ) 
Phase 
Number Protocol 
B303 The 13th looks pretty good 
for him , 
B304 No , he ( Delta ) is going to 
take it on the 13th 
B305 there ' s  no problem with 
Charlie 
B306 so  he ' ll take it on the 
12th , not the 13th . 
B307 Oh , it ' s  not offered on 
the 12th , it ' s  on the 11th . 
B308 So move him to the 11th . 
B309 OK , the next one is Echo . 
B310 The first one ( T-2 day ) 
i s  on the 4th , 
B311 the last one was on the 
21st • • •  
B312 Oh , he ' s  going to be a 
tough • • •  
B313 the 11th • • •  
B314 I already gave it to 
someone on the 11th 
B315 so we ' ll have to cross off 
Charlie ( on the 11th ) • • •  
Motes 
In B301 - B308 , S-1 dis covers 
that he should have s cheduled 
Delta prior to Charlie ; he 
had observed in B302 that 
Charlie  was "pretty easy to 
schedule all the way around. "  
S-1 schedules Echo for the 11th 
and again switches Charlie to 
another day . 
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Table 6 ( continued ) 
Phase 
Number 
B 316 
B317 
B318 
B 319 
B320 
B321 
B322 
B323 
B324 
B325 
Protocol 
I ' m looking at the 6th for 
Charlie .  
He can go to T-1 , T-2 in 
a row. 
There ' s  no problem on that . 
That gives him ( Charlie )  
two ( training ) days in a 
row , 
als o gives him more days 
o ff in a row , 
plus enables me to get 
Echo s et up . 
So  I ' ll put Echo on the 
11th 
now what did you say the 
first day was ? 
The 4th? 
Somebody ' s  got to go on 
the 4th . 
B326 And that ' s  Fox .  
B327 And oh good , we got some 
open periods here ( for 
Gulf ) .  
Notes 
No learning is  evideri"ced.  
( s ee B301 - B 30 8 )  
I n  B310 and B311 , S-1 s canned 
the set o f  T-2 days , but it  
is  obvious that thes e  days 
were not intern ali zed into 
long-term memory for future 
reference . 
It is  unclear why s omeone 
must go on the 4th. 
Phas e 
Numb e r  
B328 
B329 
B330 
B331 
B332 
B333 
B334 
Table 6 ( continue d ) 
Protocol 
18 , 19 , and 20 • • •  
Ri ght there , 19 , 
no one i s  s cheduled , 
ther e fo re , the las t  one 
h e re ( Gul f ) wi ll co on 
the 19th . 
Then everybody i s  s chedule d  
o n  a di ffe rent day for 
T-2 , T-1 , 
and all the prerequi s ites 
are met -
99% o f  ther.i . 
Notes 
Final s olut i on achi eve d .  
) = impli e d  re feren c e s  
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A1 
A2 
B1 
B2 
Cl 
C2 
Di 
D2 
E1 
E
2 
F1 
F2 
G1 
G2 
Table 1 
Fin al  Solution Set For Problem Space #2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21  22 23  24 2 5  26 2 7  28 
A A 0 T2 Tl A A 0 
A A 0 T2 Tl A A 0 
E A A 0 A A 0 E E E T2 Tl A A 0 A A 0 
A A 0 A A 0 T2 Tl A A 0 A A 0 
A A 0 Tl T2 A A 0 A A 0 
A A 0 Tl T2 A A 0 A A 0 
0 Tl A A  0 T2 A A 0 A A 
0 Tl E E  A A 0 T2 A A 0 E E E A A 
E A A O E A A O  T2 E A A 0 E A A 0 Tl E E 
A A 0 A A 0 T2 A A 0 A A 0 Tl 
T2 Tl A A 0 A A 0 A A 0 A A 0 
T2E Tl E A A 0 E A A 0 E A A 0 E A A 0 
A A 0 E E  Tl A . A  0 T2 E E E A A 0 A 
A A 0 E E Tl A A 0 E T2 E E A A 0 A 
� 
..... 
A 
B 
c 
u2= 
D 
E 
F 
� 
G 
f 
Table 8 
Utility Matrix for Problem Space #2 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15  16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23  24 2 5  26 27 28 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 l 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 - 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 l 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Q .  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 l 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 l · l 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
� 
I\) 
U
lO ,N l is indifferent to 
U5 ,N '2 
i s  pref erred to 
U6 ,N ,2 
i s  pref erred to 
u 
7 ,N ,2 
i s  pref erred to 
ua ,N ,2 
is pref erred to 
u 9 ,N , 2  i s  pref erred to 
u 12 ,N , 2  is  pref erred to 
u 13 ,N , 2  i s  pref erred to 
U14 ,N , 2  is  pref erred to 
u 10 ,N , 2  
u 5 ,N ,1 
U6 ,N , l  
u 
7 ,N , l  
0a ,N , 1 
u 9 ,N , l  
u 12 , N , l  
u 13 , N , l  
U14 ,N , l  
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It is  self-evident ( from the preceedirig comparisons ) that the solu-
ti on to Problem Set #2 is  of higher quality than the solution obtain�d in 
Problem Space #1 . Individuals #3 , #4 , #9 , and #10 are indifferent be-
tween either solution ; however , Ind . #4 , #9 , and #10 had no revealed pref­
erences ,  so thi s outcome would have been expected . Thus , only #3 was in­
different to either solution when considering tangible , revealed pref­
erences � The remaining eight individuals ( #5 ,  #6 , #7 , #8 , #9 , #12 , #13 ,  
114 ) are i n  relatively better "chosen positions " in Problem Space #2 than 
in Problem Space #1 . 
Problem Solving Behavior 
With these bas i c  facts in mind , one can state that : Due to the p 
perceptu8.l.ly-distorting inclusion of key noise variables in Prob
lem Space 
11 (which were not effectively filtered out ) , the subj ect ' s  problem solving ·  
behavior was influenced detrimentally in the sense that th
e over-all 
quality of the decision was of a lower quality tha
n the dec i sion reached 
using similar internal data but with key noi se vari able s excluded.  The 
implications of this phenomenon have far-reaching effects on the entire 
spectrum of managerial decisions . 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
Using �he framework which has been developed , in addit i on to the 
empiri cal data collected fron S-1 , several con clusi ons can be di7awn con­
cerning human problem solving .  Before proceeding to thi s area ,  it may be 
benefic i al t o  dispel any apprehensions which may be pres ent as to the ap­
pli cation of any of the conclus ions  which are made . Due to the small sam­
ple s i ze ( 1 ) , the econometrician may state that no stat i sti cally signi fi­
cant con c lus i ons  may be drawn . In almost every endeavor of econ omic re­
search , this statement would be irrefutable . However , in  information 
theory , attempts at stati stical inference are highly suspe ct . ( This was 
emphasi zed i n  Chapter 2 ) . Informati on theories , specifically problem solv­
ing theories , are dynami c ,  hi story-dependent syste�s whi ch are saturated 
with " c ontent" . Attempts to compare actual problem s olving behavi or with 
theory ,  in the traditional econometri c sense , is fruitle s s � 
This does not ree an that additi onal protocols from different subj ects 
would not be he lpful in substantiating any conclusi ons . On the contrary , 
this type of data c ollecti on was undertaken in order to test the general 
conclusi ons , but no attempts were made to include detai ls of these addi­
tional protocols . Thi s omi s sion was purposeful for it would be impossible 
Within the s c ope of this paper to deal with the specifi c  aspects of each 
Protocol. By analyzing one protocol in depth , it  was felt that the reader 
WOUld benefit more than from a cursory examination of many protocols . Al­
though the degree of variation in utility ( i. e . , revealed prefere
nces met ) 
from Problem Space #1 t o  Problem Space #2 over the subj ects t
ested was 
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consi derable , the results were i dentical in the ordinal sense ( i . e . , solu-
tions to  Problem Space #2 )yielding greater utility than s olutions to Prob-
lem Space  #1 . Thi s  uti lity variation between problem spaces  would be of 
. .  
interest to the psychologi st in examining the function of fi ltering me chan-
isms ; however , for the purpose of this paper , it i s  suffi cient to acknowl-
edge that vari ati on does exist , and to make pre s cript i ons on methods for 
reducing the s e  di fferences from problem space to problem space . 
Classic  "Economic Man" Asswr.ptions 
To begin thi s di scussion , it was noted that several clas s i c  e conomic 
assumpti ons vould be relaxed during the course of thi s  paper . The appli-
cabi lity of thi s procedure wi ll now be di scussed for each as sumpti on .  
( l ) Maximi zing Behavior --- Throughout S-l ' s prot ocol , there is  
evidence that hi s problem solving behavior was not maximi zing behavi or , 
but was s at i s fi cing behavior . A prime example : while s cheduling reve aled 
preferences , the subj e ct stated ,  "OK , and he ' s  ( F2 ) got Education days • • •  
Section 1 or 2 ,  vhi ch would be best ? I think , uh ,  either one doe sn ' t  make 
much differenc e  • • •  I ' ll give him the Educ . #2 days • • •  " There i s  no evidence 
in thi s  example that S-1 was attempting to maximi ze ; instead , he sought an 
expediti ous s at i s factory s olution .  Thi s proved true throughout the prob-
lem s olving process . 
( 2 )  Goal-Directe d  Behavior --- All evi dence indi cates that S-l ' s  
problem s olving behavi or i s  consistent with a heuri sti c search process , 
solving subproblems within the total problem space . After solving a sub-
Problem , he begins " ascending" through the problem space unt
il he has 
sol d The path he follows i s  obvi ously not a Ve · all relevant problems . 
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straight lin e  from problem t o  s oluti on ,  but rathe r involves " educated 
muddling" (proce e ding in the general direct i on of a s olut ion), as problem 
s olve r  collects addit ional infonr.ati on conce rning his p roblem space . Thus 
the problem s olve r  may choose a particular cours e of act ion which i s  incon-
sistent with hi s g oals , but after the di s covery of thi s fact , he will re­
trace his s earch p ath (by e rasing , recons ide ring ,  changing as s ignments ,  
etc. ) and pursue e different , hopefully more fruitful, pathway . 
( 3 ) Optimum Deci s ions --- Nowhere in S-l' s prot ocol can be found any 
reference t o  hi s s earching for an optimum de ci s i on . Such stat ements by 
S-1 as "not bad at all" , " • • •  that's fai r • • •  " ,  and "you figure you gotta 
lose them once in a while" . indi cate that S-1 . is n ot s e arching for an 
optimum decis ion .  S-1 i s  looking for � s oluti on h e  is motivate d  ·t o  
perform we ll ,  but thi s fact s ays n othine about the type of s oluti on S-1 
hope s  t o  att ain .  An analogy t o  S-l's problem s olving b ehavior i s  th e p ar-
able of the man s e arching for " a  ne edle in a haystack" ; he  is n ot s earch-
ing for the sharp e st (optimum) needle , he i s  simply s earching for !:_ needle . 
This " s at i sficing b ehavi or" se ems more cons istent with man's p roblem s olv-
ing behavi or than the " ideal" s olutions whi ch are expect e d  of e con omi c  
man .  
( 4 ) Ration al B ehavi or --- "Rati onal rian" i s  syn on omous with " econ omi c 
man" . All current res earch on the problem s olving behavi or of man reveals 
that man' s  rat ionali ty is lird.ted by hi s shortcomings in trans fering data 
from sh ort t e rm memory t o  l ong term memory. Addit ionally, i t  has been 
Sbo�� f lt r di st orted, fi lte ring reechanisms w u through out thi s pape r that au y ,  o 
allow "n oi se" t o  be internali zed , and the s oluti ons whi ch re
sult from the 
. "­
. ...  
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internali zation of noise  factors often lead the problem solver t o  low 
de ci s i ons . 
Role of External Data 
In analyzing S-l ' s  protocol of Problem Space #2 , it was · evi dent that 
the external data set , ( i . e . , the symbols used to represent people ) , had a 
small influence on S-l ' s  perceptual mechani sms , and that nearly all of 
S-l ' s  energies  were directed toward problem s olving activity . S-1 normal­
ly had very little i dea of "whom" he was scheduling . Often even his 
spatial perceptions became confused , as he was genuinely uncon cerned with 
the " symbols" for his inputs . · His primary concern was to meet expressed 
preferences .  His  di sregard for the "symbols" ass ociated with each indi-
vi dual lead repe atedly to scheduling B ' s  revealed preferences in C ' s por-
tion of the matrix and vi ce vers a.  Thus the reader has little doubt as t o  
the marginal benefit o f  the external data i n  Problem Space #2 . B y  direct 
means vi a the protocol , it becomes obvi ous that the external data set , or 
interface 1 between Problem Space #2 and S-1 ' s internal representation , 
was virtually non-exi stent . It can be concluded that there was a free ex­
change of internal data to and from the subject ' s  internal representati�n 
with very little fi ltering of relevant information . 
In Problem Space #1 there is  no protocol to analyze . Thi s makes 
direct investigat i on into the role of the external data set impossible . 
Hovever , . there does exi st a final solution to Problem Space #1 and thi s 
solution may be co�pared to the solution of Problem Space #2 . As indi-
cated in Chapter 5 ,  thi s compari son yields the result that the two solu• 
tions are very different in the utility for a maj ority of the indivi duals 
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being s cheduled . Therefore , the internal representat ion of the task in 
Problem Spac e #1 must have contained different symbol structures than the 
internal representation of Problem Space #2 . Thi s  differenc e c ould only 
be the result of the interface ( i . e . , the ext ernal data ) . Somehow this 
data provided a filter which influenc ed the internal representation of 
Problem Space #1 . This filter did not influence the problem constraints , 
as the s olution met all constraints . The only influenc e of the external 
data interfac e was on int ernal representat ion of the revealed preference$ 
of the human inputs . The type of filter ing mechanisms operating will now 
be explained . 
Perceptual Filt ering Mechanisms 
In physical systems , such as an electrical system , the engineer is  
concerned with filtering out all extraneous electrical nois e  ( or external 
data } whi ch will affect the funct ioning of his system . Thi s i s  the exact 
phenomenon being witnes sed in Problem. Space #1 --- nois e  which is not be­
ing filt ered out of the system . This noise ( the names and ranks of indi­
viduals }  is int ernalized after being evaluated by the subj ect . In Table 
( 2 )  are listed bas ic evaluation actions .  A typical evaluation proc ess of 
the perceptual filtering mechanism would be : 
(l }  Find the sourc e of data . Problem solver recalls past experi-
ences with the person ' s  name � 
(2 1  D et ermine from memory what data has previously been
 gathered 
related to this name ( i . e . , symbol structure l . 
(3 1'  Dec ide whether the data is relevant or irrelevant . 
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( 4 )  Apply this data to problem solution if the dat a was determined 
relevant . 
Although , ideally , the " rational" problem s olver should disregard 
all preconceived att itudes and perceptions in memory and rej ect all ex-
ternal data , he obviously does not in Problem Spac e #1 , for his final solu-
tion is  different from the final solut ion to Problem Space #2 , which had 
.. 
no ext ernal noi s e  variables internali zed . 
Thus , noise  is  internalized and act s as a subsequent perceptual 
filtering mechanism .  Thereafter , as any data , ext ernal or internal , is  
" evaluated" for internali zation , the perceptual filt er " feeds back" on 
the input translat.i on process (much as electr;i..cal noise causes feedback ) 
causing crucial internal data (revealed preferences ) to  be  filtered out . 
There are three alternatives to insure that dec i si ons are con-
s istent with revealed pr eferences , as well as problem constraints . The 
first involves the direct influence of the symbol structures in memory . 
The second involves manipulation of key ext ernal data (much as was done in 
Problem Spac e #2 ) . The third method circumvent s man in problem solving 
and replac es his natural interfaces and problem solving process es with 
artificial one s . 
Direct Influence of Symbol Structures·  in Memory 
To influenc e  preconceived attitudes and perceptions in memory re-
quires conditi oning which is as complex as man himself . The central 
th l 
. ? " 
issue i s  "how do these preconceived ideas manifest emse  ves
 in memory . 
Several explanati ons are poss ible : 
( 1 ) The physical external environment i s  in
fluencing the problem 
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spac e as perceived by problem solver 
( 2 }  Int erpersonal c onflict s between problem s olv er and group mem­
bers influence the problem space 
( 3 )  So�ial pres sures of peers and superior s  influenc e the problem 
spac e . 
Any one of these explanat ions could just ify the e st abli s hment of 
prec onc eived noti ons . The feasibility of attempting t o  explain ab stract 
interrelationships between ext ernalit ies and the mind rapidly det eri orat es 
to zero . It has been suggested that every "bit " of informat i on which en-
ter s  the brain for the first t ime int rcduc e s  a change in an RNA molecule 
containing neurons for that purpose . This changed RNA synthe s i zes a com-
pletely new prot ein ; when addit ional "bit s "  of informati on ent er the ner-
vous system , they c an then be "matched" t� the RNA/protein c ombinations 
already pre s ent . When a "match" occur s , we "remember" .  
Behavioral c ondit ioning may provide an alt ernat ive t o  an actual 
molecular understanding of the brain in influenc ing symbol structure . 
Conditioning develops in respons e  to an as soc iat ion --- it i s  as though the 
body were c apable of hooking neural pathways together t o  achieve a shortcut . 
Thus , if fac ed with a s ituation such as produced in Problem Space #1 , an 
ideal · c ondit i oning situat ion sould be "meet ing revealed preferenc e s "  means 
"monet ary r ewards "  means " produc ing quality dec i s i ons " . Then the newly­
establi shed nerve pathway translates into : "meet ing r evealed preferences" 
me " d · 1 · t d · · " ans pro uc ing qua 1 y eci sions . ( Thi s resembles the mathemat ical 
axiom A=B , B=C , then A=C ) . Conditioning need not be logic al ; it i s  pos s ible . 
to condition any dec i s ion maker through as sociat ion . Unfortun
ately , c ondi­
tioning c an be reversed almost as readily as it was creat e
d . 
Example of rever sed conditioning: 
( l )  As sume an interpersonal conflict between S-1 and Ind . #X . 
( 2 )  Conditioning establi shed : " Int erper s onal c onflict" means 
" fr t t •  ,, . " . us ra ion means not meeting revealed preferenc es . "  
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( 3 )  If t he frustration of interpersonal c onflict becomes stronger 
than the monetary rewards of producing higher quality dec i s i ons by "meet­
ing revealed preferences" , then the original conditioning will be re-
placed with a new c onditioning st imulus : "Meet revealed preferences exc ept 
when applicable to Ind . #X" . 
( 4 )  R esult : the original neural pathway i s  augment ed , such that : 
"Meet ing revealed preferenc es ( exc ept for Ind _. #X ) "  means "monetary re-
wards " means " quality dec i s ions" . 
A mass ive " c ondit ioning program" ( i . e . , c onditioning for quality 
deci s i ons with the use  of monetary rewards ) would develop int o  an economic 
and psychologi c al ni ghtmare . It would be nec es sary to e st ablish a dynamic 
equilibrium between monetary rewards and dynamically-developed perc ept ions 
and attitudes . 
Manipulati on of Key Ext ernal D ata 
The s implest method of insur ing high quality dec i s i on s  i s  to man-
ipulat e  key external data to approximate an empty s et ( in terms of Problem 
Solver ' s  preconc eived attitudes and perc ept ions ) ; the interfa c e  between 
the problem spac e and the int ernal representat ion of the problem space then 
becomes non-existent .  Experimentally ,  this method . i s  sat i sfactory ,  bec
ause 
learni_ng behavi or c an be discounted ; however ,  in an ongoing oper
at i on ,  
Where t he t ime element i s  of relatively long durat i on when
 ·compar ed t o  the 
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t ime required for learning to take place , the ingenuity of man supercedes _ 
all effort s at data manipulation . Even if it were feasible t o  c ontinually 
change the symbols as soc iated with the human input s ,  a problem s olver 
would s oon deduce ,  through pattern recognit ion , whic h  people are request-
ing which revealed preferences . Thus , once again , noi s e  would become in-
ternali zed , and distort the functioning of the input translat ion mechanism . 
Use of an Arti fic ial Interface 
The last method of insuring that dec isions are c ons i stent with 
revealed preferenc es is the construction of an " art i ficial" interface be-
tween the problem space and the internal representat ion . The interface 
is an artifice in the form of an electronic computer and the internal 
representat ion is the " hardward and software" of the computer system � 
The technic al aspect of thi s method involves creat ing general prob-
lem s olving ( GPS ) programs which are capable of simulating human thought 
processes . The c omputer ( as the interfac e and the "brain". ) i s  void of all 
preconceived perceptions and attitudes that plague man ' s  problem solving 
process es . Such programs , usually heuri stic , have been developed and show 
applicability for management . The constraining factor of GPS programs 
is : c an the value of the decision generated by the GPS program meet the 
variable c ost s as sociat ed with the deci s ion making process , where the cost 
of an art i ficial system is  direct ly related to the level of abstraction of 
the problem spac e . 
No "program" exi sts which i s  capable of economical
ly r eplacing man 
in generali zed "problem solving" situations . However
, the same situation 
was true 25 years  ago , with no numerical manipulat
ion device capable of 
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economically r eplaci ng a manual ac counting operat ion . Today , no large ac -
c ounting operat ion would c ons ider a mathemat ical task of large proport i ons 
without the aid of the c omputer . Thus one c ould s ay that the symbolic man-
ipulat ion programs of 1975 are at the same stage of infancy as the numeri-
cal manipulat i on programs of 195 0 . As symbolic manipulat ion programs do 
bec ome available , it must be remembered that , as a "metaphor for man" , 
these programs will be endowed with the same limit ed r at ionality and sat -
isfic ing behavior a s  their human counterpart s .  
For the s cienc e of ec onomi c s , it becomes intuit ively obvious that 
the us efulnes s  of ec onomic man , as the behavi oral member of future eco-
nomic models , is extremely . limited . As a viaqle subst itute for " ec onomic 
man" , " sat i s fi c ing man" s eems a prime candidate , g iven t he pres ent stat e  
o f  knowledge . 
· In man ' s c ont inuing search for the explanat ion t o  hi s inn er com-
plexiti es , the following quot e from Isaac As imov seems appropriat e : 
It s eems logical , somehow , to suppose that an ent ity 
that understands must be more complex than t he obj ect being 
understood .  One can therefore argue that all the abstru se 
fac et s of modern mathemat i c s  and physical s c i enc e are but 
reflect ions of thos e facets of the physical univer se which 
are simpler in structure than the human mind . Where the limit 
of understanding will be , or whether it exists at all , we c an­
not well predict , for we cannot measure
.
as yet t�e complexity 
of e ither the mind or the universe out s ide the mind . 
However , even without making measurement s ,  we can say 
as an a.Xiom that a thing is equal to it self , and that the�e­
fore the human mind in attempt ing to understand the workings 
of the human mind , fac es us with a situati on in which the en­
tity that must under stand and the obj ect to be understood are 
of equal complexity . 
the workings Does thi s mean we can never truly grasp 
of the human mind? I cannot tell . But even if we c aru:ot , it · · j t nough of it s workings to may sti ll b e  pos s ible to grasp us e . . 
be able t o  c onstruct computers that approach the humaf
n
f
m
l
in
l
d in 
though we fall short o u un-c omplexi ty and subt lety , even 
bl · the 19th c entury derst anding . ( After all , mankind was a e in 
t o  c onstruct rather complex electric al equipment despite the 
fact that the nature of the electrical cur rent was not under­
st ood , and earlier still , working steam engines were dev i s ed 
well before the laws governing their workings were under stood . )  
If we c ould do even so much we might learn enough t o  
prevent tho s e  di sorders o f  the mind , those irrat ionalit ies and 
pas s i ons , that have hitherto perpetually frustrated the best 
and noble st e ffort s of mankind . If we could but reduce the 
phenomena of imaginat i on ,  intuition , and creat ivity to analysis 
by phys ical and chemic al laws , we might be able t o  arrange to 
have the effects of genius on steady tap , so t o  speak , rather 
than be forced to wait for niggardly c hanc e t o  supply the human 
race with geniuses  at long - intervals only .  
Man would then , by his own exertions , bec ome more than 
man , and what might not be accomplished thereafter ? It is quite 
c ertain , I am sure , that none of us will live to see the far­
distant t ime when thi s mi ght come to pass . And yet , t he mere 
thought that such a day might some day come , even though it will 
not dawn on my own vi s ion , i s  a profoundly sat i s fying one . 
85  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
86 
-
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Little , I . M .D . ,A Critique of Welfare Economic s .  Ox�ord : Univer s ity 
Press ,  1956 . 
87 
Newell , Allen , and Herbert A. S imon , Human Problem Solving . New Jersey 
Prentic e-Hall , Inc . , 1972 . 
Simon , Herbert A . , The Sc ienc es of the Art ificial . Mas sachusett s :  M . I . T . 
Pr es s , 1969 . 
Simon , Herbert A . , The Shape of Automation for Men and Management . New 
York : Karper and Row , 1965 . 
APPENDICES 
88 
89 
APPENDIX 1 
HEURISTICS : A BACKGROUND 
A .  Heur i stic s 
H.eurist ic � can be basically explained as follows : 
1 .  Problem solving proc eeds by erecting goal s , detecting differenc es· 
between present situation . and goal , finding in memory , or by search , 
tools or processes  that are relevant to reduc ing differenc e s  of these 
particular kinds , and applyi�g these tools or proc e s s e s . Each problem 
generates  subproblems unt il we find a subproblem we c an solve --- for 
which we already have a program stored in memory . We proceed until ,  
by suc c e s s ive solut ion of such subproblems , we eventually achieve our 
over-all goal --- or give up . l 
· 
2 .  Heuri stic programming represents a point of view in the des ign of 
programs for complex information proces sing tasks . Thi s point of view 
is  that the programs should not be limited to numerical proc esses , or 
even to orderly systematic non-numerical proc e sses , or even to orderly 
systematic non-numerical algorithms of the kind s  familiar from the more 
traditional uses of computers , but that ideas should be borrowed also 
from the less  syst ematic , more selective , processes  that humans u·se in 
handling tho s e  many problems that have not been reduc ed to algorithm .  
It i s  a nec e ssary point o f  view i f  the goal o f  the program writing is  
to s imulate human thinking . It  may turn out to be a useful point of 
view if  the goal of the program writing is  to supplement natural in­
t elligenc e with arti fic ial int elligence in management dec i s ion making 
to bring in the computer as a problem-solving aide to the manager . 2 
B .  Shape o f  Des ign of Complex Systems : Hierarchy 
The basic idea i s  that the several components in any complex system 
will perform particular subfunctions that contribute to  the over-all 
funct ion . Just as the " inner environment " of the whole system may be 
defined by descr{bing it s funct ions , and without detailed spec ifica­
tion of its mechani sms , so the "inner environment " of each of the sub­
systems may be defined by describing the functions �f th�t subsystem 
and without detailed spec ific ation of its submechani sms . 
ls imon , The Shape of Automation for Men and Management , op . c it . , 
p . 83 . 
2Ibid . , p .  86 . 
3simon ,  The Science s  of the Art ificial , op . c it . ,
 P ·  73 . 
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C .  Hierarchic Systems 
By a hierarchic syst em , or hierarchy , I mean a syst em that is compos ed of i�t e:related subsystems , each of the latter being , in turn , hier­archic in ·structure until we reach some lowest level of elementary 
subsystem . In most systems in nature , it i s  s omewhat arbitrary as to where we leave off the partitioning and what . subsystems we take as ele­
mentary . Phys i c s  makes much use of the c onc ept of  "elementary par- · 
t ic le'' , although particles have a disconc erting t endency not to remain elementary very long . Only a couple of generat ions ago , the atoms 
themselves were elementary part icles ; today , to the nuclear phys icist 
they are complex syst ems . For c ertain purposes  of astronomy , whole 
star s , or even galaxies , can be regarded as elementary subsystems . In one kind of biological research , a cell may be treat ed as an elementary 
subsystem ; in another , a protein molecule ; in still another , an amino 
ac id residue . 
Just why a scienti st has a right to treat a� elementary a sub syst em 
that i s  in fact exc eedingly complex is  one of the questions we shall 
take up . For the moment , we shall accept .the fact that sc ient i st s  do 
this all the time and that , if they ar e careful scienti st s , they usual­
ly get away with it . 
. Etymologically , the word "hierarchy" has had a narrower meaning than 
I am giving it here . The term has generally been used to refer to a 
complex system in which each of the subsystems i s  subordinated by an 
authority relation to the system it belongs to . More exactly , in a 
hierarchic formal organi zation , each system consi st s  of a "bos s "  
and a s et o f  subordinate subsys tems • Each o f  the subsystems has a 
''bo s s u  who i s  the immediate subordinate of the bos s  of the system .  We 
shall want to consider systems in which the relat ions among subsystems 
are more complex than in the formal organizational hierarchy just de- ·· 
sc ribed . We shall want to inc lude systems in which there is  no rela� · 
tion of subordination among subsystems . In fact , even in human organ­
izations ,  the formal hierarchy exist s  only on paper ; the r eal flesh­
and-blood organi zation has many int erpart relations other than the 
lines of formal authority ) .  For lack of a better term , I shall use 
"hierarchy" in the broader sense introduced in the pr evious paragraphs , 
to refer to  all complex systems analyzable into suc c e ssive set s  of 
subsystems and speak of "formal hierarchy" when I want to refer to 
the more s;ec ialized conc ept . (The mathematical term npartitioning" 
will not do for what I call here a hierarchy ; for the set of sub­
systems ,  and t he successive subsets  in each of t�ese  define s the par­
t itioning ,  independently of any systems of _
rel�t ions amon� the
.
sub­
s et s . By "hierarcbyrt I mean the partttioning in conjunction with the 
relat ions that hold among it s parts 1 . 
4r.bid . ,  p .  87 . 
D .  Evolution of Complex Systems 
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By employi�g heuristi c s  as a tool for dealing with c omplex systems , we are sa�in� that a complex system (physical , biological , or social ) i s  a �uri st ic sy�tem . To make thi s  as sumpt ion , we are making an al­t ernative
. 
as sumpt ion on the evolution of complex systems . The topic of evolution may be explained by the following parable :  
"There onc e were two watchmakers ,  named Hora and Tempus , who manu­
factured very fine watches ·. Both of them were highly regarded and 
the phones in their workshops rang frequently --- new customer � were 
constantly calling them . How�ver , Hora prospered , while Tempus became 
poorer and poorer and finally lost his shop . What was the reason? 
"The watches the men made consi sted of about 1 , 000 part s each . Tern.pus 
had so construct ed his that if he had one partly a s s embled and had to" 
put it down --- to answer the phone , say --- it immedi ately fell to 
pieces  and had to be reas sembled from the element s . The better the 
customers liked his watches , the more they phoned him and the more dif­
ficult it became for him to. find enough uninterrupt ed time to finish a 
watch . 
"The watche s  that H.ora made were no les s  complex than those  of Tempus . 
But he had designed them so that he could put together subassemblies 
of about ten elements eac h .  Ten of these subassemblie s , again , could 
be put together into a larger subas sembly ; and a system o f  ten of the 
latter subassemblies  const itut ed the whole watch . Henc e , when Hora 
had to put down a partly as sembled small part of hi s work , and he as­
sembled hi s watches in only a fraction of the man-hours it took Tempus . 
"It i s  rather easy to make a quantitative analysi s  of the relative dif­
ficulty of the tasks of Tern.pus and Hora . Suppose the probability that 
an interruption will occur while a part i s  being added t o  an incomplet e 
assembly i s  p .  Then the probability that Tempus c an complete a watch 
he has started without interruption is  ( 1-p ) lOOO --- a very small 
number unless p i s  0 . 001 or les s . Each interrupt ion will cost , on the 
average , the time to as semble l/p part s (the expect ed number assembled 
before interrupt ion ) . On the other hand , Hora has to c omplet e 111 sub­
assemblies of t en part s eac h .  The probability that h e  will not b e  in­
terrupted while completing any one of these i s  (1-p ) lO , and each inter­
rupt ion w111 co st only about the time required to ass emble five part s . 
(The speculations on speed of evolut ion were fir st �ugg:sted by � ·  
Jacobson ' s  applicat ion of information theory to estimating the t ime re­
quired for b iological evolut ion . See his paper "Information , Repro­
duct ion ,  and the Origin of Life" , in "American �c i en� i s� " ;  43 ' :  119-127 . 
(January 195 5 1 . l  From thermodynamic considerations it i s  po ssible to 
estimate the amount of increase in entropy that oc:ur s when a :ompl
ex 
system dec ompos e s  into it s element s . But e�tropy is the l
ogarithm
.
of 
a probability henc e information , the negative of entr
opy ,
_
c�n be in­
terpret ed as the logarithm of the rec iprocal �f t�e pr�bability -�­
the ' improbability ' , so  to speak . The essential 
idea in Jacobson s 
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m�del is that �he .
expected time required for the system to reach a par­t icular state i s  inver sely proport ional to the probability of the state henc e it increases exponent ially with the amount o f  informat ion ( neg­entropy } of the state . Following thi s line of argument , but not intro­duc ing the notion of levels and stable subas s embli e s , Jacobson arr ived 
at e stimat es of the time required for evolut ion so large as to make the 
event rather improbable . Our analysi s , carr i ed through in the same 
way , produc e s  very much smaller estimat es ) . 
"Now if p i s  about 0 . 01 --- that is , ther e i s  one chanc e in a hundred 
that either watchmaker will be interrupt ed whil e  adding any one part 
to an as sembly --- then a straight forward c alculat ion shows t hat it 
will take Tempus , on the average , about four thousand t imes as  long to 
ass emble a watch as Hora . "5 
By applying thi s to biological syst ems , we c an say that "If there ex­
ist s  a hierarchy of pot ent ial stabl e ' suba s s emblie s ' ,  with about the 
same span , s ,  at each level of the hierarchy , then the t ime required 
for a subas sembly can be expected to be about the same at each level 
that i s , proport ional to 1/ ( 1-p ) s . The time required for the as sembly 
of a system of !!. element s will be proportional to log s .!!_, that is , to 
the number of levels in the syst em .  One would say --- with more illus­
trat ive than lit eral int ent --- that the t ime required for the evolu­
t ion of mult ic elled organi sms from single-c elled organi sms might be of 
the same order of magnitude as the t ime requir ed for the evolut ion of 
single-c elled organi sms from macromolecules . "6 
E .  Problem Solving a s  Natural Selection 
Let us turn now to some phenomena that have no obvious c onnect ion with 
biologic al evolut ion : human problem-solving proc e s ses . Consider , for 
example , the t ask of discovering the proof for a di fficult theorem . 
The proc e s s  c an be --- and oft en has been --- described as  a s earch 
through a maz e . Start ing with the axioms and previously proved 
t heorems , var ious transformations allowed by the rules of the mathema­
t i c al systems are attempted , to obtain new expre s s ions . These are 
modifi ed in turn unt il , with per si st enc e and good fortune , a s e quenc e 
or path of trans format ions i s  discovered that leads to the goal . 
The proc e s s  ordinarily involves much tr ial and error . Various paths 
are tr ied ; some are abandoned , others are pushed further . Before a 
solution is found many paths of the maze may be explor ed . The more 
difficult and nov�l the problem , the greater i s  likely to be t�e a.mount 
of trial and error required to find a solution . At the same t :ime , the 
5rbid . ,  pp . 90-92 . 
6rbid . , p .  93 . 
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tr ial and error is not complet ely random o r  blind � it i s , i n  fact , 
rather highly selective . The new expr es s ions t hat are obtained by 
transforming given one s are examined to see whether t hey represent 
progr e s s  toward the goal . Indicat ions of progre s s  spur further search 
in t he same direct ion ; lack of . progress signals the abandonment of a 
line of search . Problem solving requir es trial and error . • •  A con­
s iderable amount has been learned in the past five year s about the 
natur e of the maz e s  that represent common human pr oblem-solving . tasks 
proving theor ems , solving puz zles , playing ches s ,  making investment s , 
balanc ing as s embly lines , to ment ion a few . All that we have learned 
about the s e  ma z e s  po int s  to the same c onclusion : that human problem 
solving , from the most blundering to the most ins ight ful , involve s 
nothing more than varying mixtur es of trial and error and s elect ivity . 
The select ivity derives from various rules of thumb , or heur i st ic s , 
that suggest whic h  paths should be tr i ed fir st and which leads are 
promis ing . We do not need to postulat e proc e s s e s  mor e sophi sticat ed 
than tho s e  involved in organic evolut ion to explain how enoumous prob­
lem maz e s  are cut down to quite reasonaole size . 7  
7 rbid . , PP · 95-97 : 
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APPENDIX II 
A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE PRODUCTION SYSTEMS* 
Pl . If  a new .expression determining an assignment (either = or � )  has 
been produc ed , then find a column that contains the variable involved 
in the expres s ion , and proc ess  that column , PC [col� • If no column 
i s  produc ed by FC , then of course PC i s  not evoked ; that i s , the se­
quential act ion is c onditional on appropriate output s '  being produc ed 
by prior act ions . This production represent s . t he suoj ect ' s  ability 
to t ake new informat ion and �pply it elsewhere to get yet more new in­
formation . It s evocation depends only upon some new information being 
available .  Suc c e s sful execution of the product ion r�ove s  the �new tag 
from the r ecognized assignment-expres s ion ; thus the product ion will not 
be repeated . 
P2 . If the goal has been s et to evaluate a variable ,  or e stabli sh a spec if­
ic value for a variable C<variable} = (general-digit) ) ,  then find a 
column containing that variable (FC ) , and proce s s  that c olumn for the 
variable (PC ) . Again ; if  no column . i s  produc ed by FC , PC i s  not evoked . 
P2 can be applied repeatedly to the same variable , gradually to accumu­
late information about it . The goal can either be t o  get informat ion 
abo-q.t a variable , or to  obtain some relation , as in ( get c 5  = 1 )  • · 
P3 . 
P4 . 
P5 . 
Both Pl and P2 have fundamentally the same act ion sequenc e ,  yet they 
der ive from quite different conc erns . The former i s  evoked by new in­
formation about a variable , the latter by the goal o f  getting such in� 
formation . 
If the goal has been set to get the value of letter . l ,  find a column 
containing letter . ! ,  then assign a value to  the other letter , lett er . 2 ,  
that appears in the column , after which letter . l  may be determined 
us ing PC . P3 provides an alternative means for r eaching a goal . It 
give s  the appearanc e ,  whether justified or not , of being les s arbi­
trary than simply assigning a value to letter . l . 
If the goal has been set to evaluate a variable that i s  constrained 
in its s et o f  pos s ible values --- i . e . , occur s in a constraint-expres­
sion --- generate  it s admissible values .  If there are only a few 
values sat i s fying it , assign a value , AV(vari�ble ) ; otherwi se do no�h­
ing . Again ,  as with Pl , the tag , new , i s  stripped from the constra1nt-
expression by P4 . 
If the goal i s  to check a s et of columns � gener�t: . the . c olumns from 
r ight to left , execut ing PC on . each. This produc �ion i s  evoked only
 
onc e during the course  of problem solving --- namely , at th
e end ---
but it governs a rather long sequence of behavior . 
· · 
. 
t b t known (i e has t he t ag unknown ) P6 .  If an expression is  relevan u un • • ' • • ' 
th t th 1 t expression That the expre s sion i s
 unknown en se up e goa ge · · · d th t 
i s only evoked when some other proc es s attempts to
 use and fin s a 
95 
it is  unknown . Thus , expres s ions do not exist in the k.nowledge-
state for all things that are unknown , This illustrates that the 
knowledge-states  are not to be interpreted as "all things that the ob­
server c an infer the subj ect c ould know are truen .  
P7 . If it i s · known about a variable , v ,  that a c ertain fact i s  not pos­
si?le -- i. . e . , (expr e s s ion CJ )  -- then s et up the goal , get variable . 
Thi s product ion does not represent the subj ect t s  attempt to deny the 
new informat ion (which would lead to check-expr e ssion ) , but hi s ac cept­
anc e of the information , which leads him to look for another value for 
the variable .  
PB . If the goal i s  to check an expres sion that i s  new (that i s , has not 
been derived before ) ,  set up· the . goal , get expres sion . Although P8 
occurs only r ar ely , a fact may be as sumed or become known without any 
explic it prior derivation of it . This product ion s imply br idges the 
gap between the goals  t check ' and ' get ' in these  s ituations . 
P9 . If the goal i s  to evaluat e . a set of letters , find one of them (by 
means of FL ) and set up the goal of evaluating it . This product ion 
simply s elects  a member from a set . Its role i s  essentially to find 
something to work on when all else fails , sinc e the init ial problem 
i s  states  as : get all-letters . 
PlO . If an expres s ion has been cr it ical in determining some proce s s , as ex­
pressed by the tag , note , then set up the goal , check expres sion .  The 
production PlO has been stated unconditionally , but the degree of the 
subj ect ' s  c ertainty about the expres sion , expres s ed in some manner , 
will also  condit ion it s evocation . For instanc e ,  _ the subj ect will not 
check D�5 . Some , but not all , of thi s var iat ion in c ertainty i s  tak­
en c ar e  of by the fact that the tag ,  note , i s  removed from the expres­
sion by PlO (as is  ' new ' by Pl and P4 ) .  
Pll . Whenever a digit i s  newly derived as the value of a letter ( letter = 
digit new) , test if  the digit i s  admi ssible (TD ) . The r esult i s  either 
+ , indic at ing that the value i s  admi s s ible , or a change of the tag from 
new to Cl ( i . e . , letter = digit i s  a c ontradict ion ) ,  along with the 
statement of the reason for the inadmi s s ibility , ( < expression) note ) . 
Pll is also evoked when digit s are generated in the c ont ext of obtain­
ing values for a variable . Note that there i s  no s imilar check on the 
value of a carry . 
Pl2 . If it i s  determined that expression . l  i s  not pos s ible , then find ex­
pres sion . 2 ,  which was used in deriving expres sion . l ,  and declare it not 
po ssible also (expression . 2  Cl } .  Thi s product ion provides backtracking 
on a suc c es sion of implications when a contradict ion i s  discovered . 
Pl3 . I.f the result of an operator i s  unclear (i . e . , has tag , unclear } , then 
repeat Q ,  s ett ing up as the goal , get variable , where the :ariable is  
the one involved in the unclear expression . The operator i s  normally ,  
but not always clear , but complex determinations , like the infer
ence  
of (R odd } from (1 · +  L + L = R ) , are unc lear --- at least the first 
time encountered . Processes  that lead to contradictions , and those  
from . which no definite conclusion . can be drawn , are also unclear . 
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Pl4 . If the goal is to check an expression that has been der ived previously . 
find the · production used in that derivation and repeat it (after s et­
ting up the goal of getting the expres sion } . Pl4 implie s  some memory 
of product ion occurrences . 
*Pl-Pl4 extracted from · Newell and Simon ·, Human Problem Solving , op . 
cit . ,  pp . 193�195 . 
